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Abstract 
 
Access to relevant information in an understandable manner is highly important for decision 
makers in order to arrive at well-founded collective decisions, which might have far-reaching 
consequences, such as exposure to radiation. Explicitly throughout the thesis I stick to the 
assumption that the goal of any economic analysis is to supply the decision makers with 
sufficient and understandable information to make well-founded decisions. Cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) aims to play a significant informational role in decision-making processes as 
a tool of policy analysis. Its capacity to achieve this goal is considered from two standpoints: 
(A) CBA as a tool to rank alternative projects according to their social desirability; and (B) 
CBA as an informational background for the democratic decision-making procedure. In this 
thesis I investigate whether CBA can improve on democratic decision-making processes 
which concern radiation-related projects and their adverse health effects. Nuclear power-
related projects constitute a particular point of interest in this research. CBA turns out to be 
problematic to use in decision-making processes from both standpoints set above. As a tool of 
ranking the alternatives, CBA provides too aggregated information to judge about the social 
desirability of the projects because different decision makers have different political and 
ethical preferences. Applied CBA ignores distributional concerns, but if ignored, the very 
distribution of radiation-related risks to human life and health can be unfair. CBA rests upon 
monetary valuation of the project’s effects, but putting prices on intangible values, such as life 
and health, is a highly controversial and demanding task. In addition, CBA appears to take 
improper account of risk and uncertainty, which are inherent in radioactivity. Besides, this 
thesis approaches CBA in the context of conflict. Initially some experts consider CBA as a 
measure to control proponents of risk regulation since the latter are perceived as powerful 
political groups and thus overregulate excessively. However, it may appear to be the case that 
rather the proponents of CBA themselves constitute well-organized politically powerful 
groups, which intend to manipulate the outcome and the use of CBA. The need for stronger 
public participation in democratic decision making is stated, and possible roots of weak public 
participation are addressed. Several alternatives to CBA are proposed as well. 
Keywords: Cost-benefit analysis; Democratic decision making; Radioactivity; Nuclear power 
technology; Adverse health effects; Risk and uncertainty  
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”Samfunnsøkonomer skal tenke mer enn telle.”1 
Introduction 
Access to relevant, timely, and reliable information, provided in a convenient and 
understandable form, plays a crucial role in decision-making processes. The opportunity to 
have such information available seems to be particularly important in the fields where 
decisions might affect life and health of human beings, where possible consequences of 
decisions about projects and policies can be difficult to anticipate and assess properly due to 
risk, uncertainty, and extended time horizons. Evaluation of radioactivity-related projects and 
policies seems to be most demanding and challenging in this respect. 
Since economic issues and policy making are highly interconnected and mutually influential, 
the economist is generally supposed to supply decision makers with results of an economic 
analysis of a project or policy proposal on the agenda. One of the tools of policy analysis 
available to the economist is cost-benefit analysis. In practice, cost-benefit analysis aims to 
provide information for decision-making purposes. Hence, it is important to verify that cost-
benefit analysis properly fulfils its function in the provision of relevant information to 
decision makers when it comes to projects fraught with radiation adverse health effects. And 
an obvious criterion for the successful fulfillment of this function is likely to be decision 
makers’ easier understanding of policy effects and risks involved. 
The question I discuss is the following: Can cost-benefit analysis improve on decision-making 
processes concerning projects related to the risk of exposure to radiation and subsequent 
adverse health effects? Moreover, in order to specify the main question, I pose three sub-
questions: 
1. Can cost-benefit analysis be used to judge about the social desirability of a radiation-
related project? 
2. Can cost-benefit analysis be useful as a background for democratic decision-making 
processes, i.e. serve as an informational input in a democratic decision process, 
thereby facilitating such a process? 
                                                 
1 The epigraph is just a phrase by someone from some discussion on www.facebook.com, remembered by me a few months 
ago. I was not able to find the roots and the author of it. The translation is: “Social science economists should think more than 
count.”  
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3. Can the use of a cost-benefit analysis be endogenous to a decision-making process (i. 
e. Can CBA be deliberately chosen as a tool of policy analysis by those who are 
interested in its results)? If yes, what implications can this have for the final stage of 
decision making about a radiation-related project if weak public participation is in 
place?  
In this thesis I mainly use a theoretical approach involving a review of the relevant literature. 
As an original motivation for this thesis, I refer to an ongoing Petersburg Nuclear Physics 
Institute’s project aimed at advanced scientific research in neutron physics in Gatchina 
(Russia). They are going to put into operation an additional reactor, the so-called Reactor 
PIK. The project was frozen in the late 80s as a result of the Chernobyl disaster, then 
renewed, and today the Institute is about to go through with it (for a scientific review of the 
project see Serebrov and Okorokov 2000). The implementation of this project might worsen 
an unfavorable human health situation in the area as it is.  
The thesis consists of seven parts. Part 1 points to the significance of information in decision-
making processes. Part 2 outlines the theory of cost-benefit analysis. A simple mathematical 
model is set up and accompanied by brief descriptions of key concepts built in the cost-
benefit framework and valuation techniques such as contingent valuation and hedonic pricing. 
Part 3 introduces risk into the cost-benefit framework. Part 4 takes up the specifics of 
radioactivity, which has to be taken into account when implementation of a project entails risk 
of exposure to radiation. 
Due to several inherent weaknesses of cost-benefit analysis, its use as a tool of policy analysis 
may put obstacles in the provision of relevant and reliable information to decision makers. 
Cost-benefit analysis involves problems both on methodological and institutional grounds. 
Parts 5 and 6 are respectively concerned with methodological and institutional aspects of the 
tool. Among existing methodological issues of cost-benefit analysis, I pick up the following 
ones: distributional concerns in decision-making processes, limits to putting a monetary value 
on human health and life, and the flip side of nuclear power technology and the question of 
risk regulation. They are covered in turn in part 5.  
Part 6 deals with institutional aspects of cost-benefit analysis. First, I check whether cost-
benefit analysis satisfies criteria for democratic decision making. Then, I turn to an existing 
conflict of interests which has its roots in the presence of strong special-interest groups, on the 
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one hand, and weak public participation, on the other. Part 7 provides possible alternatives to 
cost-benefit analysis in fulfilling an informational function for the purposes of making 
decisions about radiation-related issues.  
 
1. Role of information in decision-making processes 
In the information age, when access to knowledge is about to become instant, political 
decision makers still experience a lot of difficulty in receiving relevant information to make 
decisions about alternative policies. Because their decisions are so complicated and far-
reaching, they cannot just browse the Web in the search of the only reliable solution. On the 
other hand, they do need a ‘navigation system’ to come by a well-founded decision. As 
Revesz and Livermore (2008, p 2) humorously depicted the state of affairs, “when policy 
makers make decisions without gathering all available information, looking at alternative 
courses of action, and anticipating the likely consequences of their actions, they are as foolish 
as someone who fails to consult a map when driving in unfamiliar territory.” While “all 
available information” may be difficult to understand, information sufficient for well-founded 
decisions is crucial.  
Decision makers may have their own ethical beliefs and make intuitive judgments about 
alternative projects or policies, but their decisions require to be well grounded in relevant and 
understandable information about the issues on the agenda. Therefore, scientific findings and 
recommendations play an important role in decision-making processes. However, decision 
makers encounter difficulties in making decisions because information available to them may 
not fulfill their requirements. This information may be either insufficient or abundant and 
difficult to process.  
For instance, even in such well-studied fields as radioactivity, there are divergences of views 
among experts. In particular, scientists continue to disagree about the exact health impacts of 
low doses of radioactivity (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004, p 115). On the other hand, 
decision makers’ mental capacity for processing a huge amount of available information is 
also not without limit. Like other human beings, decision makers “have a limited ability and 
time to receive and understand information. Providing too vast amounts of information may 
easily confuse decision makers rather than inform them” (Nyborg, 1996, p 94).  
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When information is incomplete or superfluous, time and budget constraints are in place, risk 
and uncertainty about the consequences of decisions are involved, a useful tool of policy 
analysis is needed to communicate health effects of radioactivity-related projects to decision 
makers. Moreover, ethical beliefs, judgments about policies, and preferred objectives of 
different decision makers are not usually absolutely congruent. They tend to diverge on a 
systematic basis. Hence, the tool of policy analysis has to be neutral in order to suit collective 
decision purposes.  
Economists are usually called on to provide decision makers with economic results of policy 
analysis. In the light of the obstacles to receiving accurate and understandable information, 
mentioned above, it makes sense to suggest that the role of the economist should be to 
facilitate the information flow, rather than complicate it. Nyborg (1996, p 8) makes a basic 
assumption that “the aim of the economic analysis is to inform participants in a political 
decision process, in order to make their individual judgments as well-founded as possible.” I 
stick to this assumption throughout the thesis.  
Regarding the problem of policy analysis, Nyborg (1996, p 89) finds it “particularly useful to 
distinguish between the following two cases: 
A. The purpose of the analysis is to arrive at a ranking of alternatives. 
B. The purpose of the analysis is to facilitate someone else’s (the decision makers’) 
ranking of alternatives.” 
Thus purpose A is aimed at judging about social desirability of alternative projects. Purpose B 
deals with provision of background information to the decision makers to improve on the 
process of making decisions. 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as an economic tool of policy analysis is considered in this 
thesis. In the literature it is sometimes referred to as ‘benefit-cost analysis’ (BCA), but this 
fact does not entail any conceptual differences between the two terms (Perman et al., 2003, p 
352). In what follows, wherever it is relevant, I distinguish between the two cases, A and B, 
proposed by Nyborg (1996), and specify the case under which CBA is being discussed. This 
is important because cases A and B are associated with sub-questions 1 and 2 respectively 
which have been posed within this thesis.  
5 
 
At this stage of the discussion, it makes sense to point out that the results of CBA for purpose 
A, i.e. when CBA serves as an output of a specific social welfare judgment, may be difficult 
or even impossible for a decision maker to use in combination with their own ethical or 
political views (Nyborg, 1996, p 89). Even among proponents of CBA there are those who 
recognize that this tool of policy analysis can only be used as one of the informational inputs 
into decision-making processes. For example, Zerbe and Bellas (2006, p 1) argue: “Care must 
be taken that unquantified or roughly quantified effects be given their proper weight. In doing 
this it is useful as well as politically realistic to regard BCA as an aid to discussion and to 
decision and not as the decision itself.”  
The acceptability of CBA as a neutral tool of policy analysis is only one side of the problem. 
The other side of the coin, no less complicated, relates to the third sub-question of the thesis. I 
restate it here: can the use of CBA be endogenous to a decision-making process? If yes, what 
implications can this have for the final stage of decision making about a radiation-related 
project if weak public participation is in place? 
If some interests are underrepresented at the final stage of a decision-making process, 
methodological weaknesses of CBA can be deliberately abused by strong special-interest 
groups in their own favor, thereby distorting even further the quality of cost-benefit 
information provided to the decision makers. For example, Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, 
p 92) argue, with regard to quantifying human health risks for the purposes of CBA: “(…) 
experience unfortunately shows that the science used in CBA can be manipulated to ensure 
results that work against regulation. The technical concepts involved, such as risk thresholds 
and dose-response relationships, have intimidated many observers, but they are important to 
understand: abuse of these concepts can make the real benefits of regulation magically seem 
to disappear.” 
Nyborg (1996, p 12) claims that if information on politically powerful groups is not provided 
to the decision makers, “politically powerful groups are presumably more than willing to 
provide information themselves; obviously having strong incentives to give biased 
information.” Therefore, in my subjective opinion, it would be relevant to ask whether it may 
happen that CBA is endogenous to a decision-making process, i.e. deliberately chosen by 
those who may intend to play on the methodological weaknesses of the cost-benefit 
framework.   
6 
 
When democracy is assumed to be an ideal to strive for, all adult citizens should be included 
in a decision-making process at its final stage. Dahl (1989) argues: “The argument for the 
Strong Principle of Equality provides the grounds we need for a criterion of inclusion that a 
democratic process would have to satisfy: the demos2 should include all adults subject to the 
binding collective decisions of the association” (p 120). I will discuss some aspects of public 
participation in part 6.  
However, even though people tend to avoid risk from nuclear power radiation, and even if 
they have knowledge and opportunities to intervene in the management of nuclear power 
(Slovic, 2000, p 269), they hardly exercise their right to participate directly at the final stage 
of a decision-making process. Within the democratic premises, Dahl (2006) refers to ‘the law 
of time and numbers’: “The more citizens a democratic unit contains, the less that citizens can 
participate directly in government decisions and the more that they must delegate authority to 
others” (pp 58-59). 
Zweifel et al. (2009, p 10) claim that when it comes to the monetary valuation of health, “the 
typical feature is that the individual does not weigh himself health against consumption. 
Rather, government or parliament decides on behalf of the citizens, and it is the task of health 
economics to provide these authorities with decision-making rules which are well-founded in 
welfare economics.” In my opinion, it seems reasonable to suggest that when public 
participation is weak and public interests are underrepresented at the final stage of a decision-
making process, the weaknesses of CBA which are grounded in the results of welfare 
economics may be abused by politically powerful groups. Here we have returned to the task 
of economists to provide decision-makers with sufficient information for well-founded 
decisions. The economist is supposed to use their best judgments to provide information that 
the decision makers may demand to improve decision making. 
As a starting point for further detailed discussion of the question whether CBA can improve 
on decision-making processes with regard to projects related to the risk of exposure to 
radiation and subsequent adverse health effects, it is reasonable to summarize the points about 
the role of information in decision-making processes. I do that by citing Nyborg (1996, p 97): 
“(…) Decision makers (…) have ethical beliefs of their own, concerning what is good and bad 
for society as a whole, which may differ between decision makers. Furthermore, when they 
                                                 
2 By the demos Dahl means the citizens, the people entitled to participate in governing. 
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decide which project to support in the political decision process, they choose in accordance 
with these subjective evaluations. But when regarding any specific project, they are only 
capable of taking a limited amount of data into account. 
Our problem as economists, now, is to present background information to the decision makers 
in a way which fits into this decision process, so that they can make use of the provided 
information in a relevant manner. If we succeed in this, decision makers have at least had the 
opportunity to ensure that their individual rankings of projects are well-informed.” 
 
2. Cost-benefit framework: key concepts and accompanying techniques 
Theoretical cost-benefit analysis has already been covered fairly enough in literature (see e.g. 
Drèze and Stern, 1987; Johansson, 1993; Perman et al., 2003). I will not discuss the 
methodology of cost-benefit analysis in great detail here, but for the purposes of this work, it 
makes sense to reproduce some relevant aspects and key concepts of the cost-benefit 
framework.   
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a tool of applied welfare economics which is intended to rank 
projects and evaluate government policy proposals according to efficiency criteria. The 
evaluation is conducted in monetary units. Stated quite simply, CBA involves weighing the 
expected benefits of a project against its expected costs. If the expected benefits exceed the 
expected costs, the project is defined as socially efficient. However, there are in-built 
concepts, assumptions, and techniques which underlie cost-benefit recommendations. They 
are therefore crucial for decision-making purposes.  
It seems relevant to set up a simple mathematical model to make the description of the cost-
benefit framework more precise. To this purpose, I use my background knowledge, in 
particular that I got from the course in Environmental Economics provided by K. Nyborg.  As 
a background to the model, I take a hypothetical social decision maker who considers a 
project aimed at reducing the risk of adverse health effects due to exposure to radiation from a 
nuclear power plant situated in the area. Say, the decision maker intends to oblige the 
management of the nuclear plant to shut down one of the reactors. Implementation of this 
project can reduce risks of adverse health effects on n individuals living in the area, but it 
suggests decreased income that can be used by them for consumption purposes. Suppose that 
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every affected individual has preferences for two goods: X – private consumption, and H – 
non-exposure to radiation. I choose money as a numéraire; 𝑋𝑖 can be regarded as an 
individual i’s total income. H is a public good, which is meant to be the inverse of a public 
bad ‘exposure to radiation’. For simplicity, the two goods are assumed to be substitutes. 
Utility is increasing in both 𝑋𝑖 and H.  
In this stage it must be admitted that although intertemporal issues are relevant to the problem 
at hand, they are beyond the scope of this work. Discounting can constitute a separate 
research work; thus time dimension is ignored throughout the thesis, and the mathematical 
model under consideration is static. The main focus of interest in this work is risk. For the 
moment (in this part) I disregard it for simplicity reasons. Risk will be introduced in part 3.  
Every individual i maximizes their well-behaved ordinal individual utility function: 
(1) 𝑈 = 𝑈𝑖�𝑋𝑖,𝐻�, 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛    
Suppose one takes a vector of small changes in the amounts of the goods �𝑑𝑋𝑖 ,𝑑𝐻�. Totally 
differentiating the utility function in (1) gives expression for the subsequent change in utility: 
(2) 𝑑𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑋𝑖 + 𝑈𝐻𝑖 𝑑𝐻                                                                                                            
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives of the ith utility function with respect to goods 
H and 𝑋𝑖. Thus 𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖  is the ith individual’s marginal utility of income.3  
The use of CBA requires the availability of a monetary measure of this utility change that 
would follow from the implementation of the project, including the utility change from 
changed radiation exposure. As long as the goods are assumed to be substitutes, the latter can 
be calculated as a maximum sum of money 𝑑𝑋𝑖 individual i is ready to give up in order to 
get 𝑑𝐻, which stands for a small increase in a public good ‘non-exposure to radiation’, say 
𝑑𝐻 = 1, provided that the associated total change in utility remains constant, i.e. 𝑑𝑈𝑖 = 0.  
With these assumptions, (2) gives: 
(3) 0 = 𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑋𝑖 + 𝑈𝐻𝑖  
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, it is a marginal utility of consumption. However, interpreting 𝑋𝑖 as an individual’s income allows 
considering  as a marginal utility of income. 
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Rearranging (3) gives: 
(4) 𝑑𝑋𝑖 = 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = 𝑈𝐻𝑖 𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖�                                                                                                         
Thus 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 stands for individual i’s marginal willingness to pay for a small increase in the 
provision of the public good ‘non-exposure to radiation’. 𝑀𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 measures thereby the net 
worth of this change to the ith individual in money terms.  
Willingness to pay (WTP) is a central concept built into the cost-benefit framework. It reflects 
the maximum amount of money the individual is willing to pay to get, or avoid, the proposed 
change. In the model the ith individual’s willingness to pay for a small increase in H (𝑑𝐻) can 
be calculated as follows: 
(5) 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 = �𝑈𝐻𝑖 𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖� � 𝑑𝐻                                                                                                             
According to the standard cost-benefit framework, the project at hand will be regarded as 
socially efficient (desirable) if the benefits aggregated across the affected individuals 
outweigh the aggregated costs, i.e. if the net benefits, 𝑁𝐵𝑖, are positive: 
(6) ∑ 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 = ∑ (𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 − 𝐶𝑖) > 0                                                                                          
where 𝐶𝑖 P denotes the cost of the project individual i is supposed to cover. 
The concept of Pareto efficiency is central here. “(…) a policy change is socially desirable if 
everyone is made better off (the weak Pareto criterion) or at least some are made better off 
(the strong Pareto criterion) while no one is made worse off. When the possibilities of making 
such policy changes are exhausted, we are left with an allocation of commodities that cannot 
be altered without someone being made worse off. Such an allocation is called Pareto-optimal 
or efficient” (Johansson, 1993, p 10). A gain by one or more persons without making anyone 
worse off is known as a Pareto improvement (Perman et al., 2003, p 107). In the model, the 
positive net benefits in (6) imply that the winners can compensate the losers; consequently, if 
such compensation occurs, the project yields a Pareto improvement. Moreover, disregarding 
actual payments, the project is said to be a potential Pareto improvement, i.e. the winners 
potentially can compensate the losers. 
This simple idea about (potential) Pareto improvement underlies the so-called ‘compensation 
tests’ such as the Kaldor and Hicks (potential) compensation tests (for profound description 
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and critics of such tests see e.g. Zerbe and Bellas (2006). These tests were devised to avoid 
explicit use of a social welfare function that I discuss below. The main argument against a 
social welfare function is that there is no generally agreed form of it.  
However, a Pareto-optimal allocation is not unique and has little to say about the optimal 
distribution of welfare. We need some further criterion for judging which Pareto-optimal 
allocation is best from a social point of view, i.e. yields a social welfare improvement.  
The concept of a social welfare function (SWF) is used for ranking alternative allocations. A 
SWF is an aggregation of individual utility functions. Varian (1992, p 333) states: “The most 
reasonable interpretation of such a function is that it represents a social decision maker’s 
preferences about how to trade off the utilities of different individuals.” However, there exists 
no single agreed-upon form of SWF. This result is due to Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
which implies that there exists no general quantitative rule to consistently aggregate 
individuals’ ordinal preferences into the results of democratic decision making (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2000, p 20). Every SWF expresses the views of a particular decision maker. 
SWF is often assumed to satisfy convenient assumptions (Johansson, 1993, pp 15-16): 
a. Social welfare depends only on the underlying individual utility levels. 
b. Social welfare is increasing with each individual’s utility level, satisfying thereby 
the (strong) Pareto criterion. Moreover, if one person is made worse off, another 
one must be made better off so that the level of social welfare be maintained. 
c. It does not matter who enjoys a high or low level of utility. 
Sen (1987) argues that ‘the reach and relevance’ of welfare economics can be widened by 
incorporating other ethical considerations, rather than only individual utilities, into a SWF. He 
defines a simple aggregation of individual utility functions as ‘welfarism’ which requires that 
“the goodness of a state of affairs be a function only of the utility information regarding that 
state” (p 39). Therefore, he emphasizes that ‘consequentialism’ is another important 
requirement for utilitarianism to be regarded as a moral principle. According to Sen, 
‘consequentialism’ requires that “every choice, whether of actions, institutions, motivations, 
rules, etc., be ultimately determined by the goodness of the consequent states of affairs” (p 
39).  
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Later, I will return to implications of the narrowed ‘welfarism’. Here I stick to it, for 
simplicity. Thus, the aggregation of individual utility functions gives a SWF that can be 
written as follows: 
(7) 𝑊 = 𝑊�𝑈1(𝑋1,𝐻), … ,𝑈𝑛(𝑋𝑛,𝐻)�                                                                                         
A widely used particular form of SWF has social welfare W as a weighted sum of the 
individual utilities: 
(8) 𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 𝑈𝑖�𝑋𝑖 ,𝐻�                                                                                                           
where w1,…, wn are weights that reflect society’s judgment about the relative emphasis to be 
put on each individual’s utility (subjective welfare weights).   
For the marginal project at hand involving 𝑑𝐻 on the benefit side and individual costs Ci, the 
total differential of SWF, 𝑑𝑊, reflects a change in social welfare: 
(9) 𝑑𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 × �−𝐶𝑖� + 𝑈𝐻𝑖 × 𝑑𝐻)                                                                               
Dividing and multiplying simultaneously both sides of the equation in (9) by the marginal 
utility of income 𝑈𝑋𝑖
𝑖  and substituting then for willingness to pay 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖, determined in (6), 
give the following equation for a social welfare improvement: 
(10) 𝑑𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 �𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖� = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑖=1                                                               
Thus 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑋𝑖
𝑖  is a welfare weight attached to individual i’s net willingness to pay for the 
project. Consequently, the net welfare gain of the project is a welfare-weighted sum of each 
individual’s net willingness to pay.  
Willingness to accept (WTA) is another available measure to estimate individual’s net 
benefits from the project. WTP and WTA can be interpreted as two monetary measures of 
utility change associated with 𝑑𝐻: compensating surplus (CS) and equivalent surplus (ES).4 
CS is the change in 𝑋𝑖 that would compensate for a marginal change in ‘non-exposure to 
radiation’, 𝑑𝐻. ES is the change in 𝑋𝑖 that would be equivalent to the proposed 𝑑𝐻. Defining 
                                                 
4 The discussion of CS and ES here is based on Johansson (1993). 
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𝐻1 as a new amount of public good available, and 𝐻0 as its initial amount, one can explain 
CS and ES mathematically in the following way: 
(11) CS: 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖 − 𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝐻1) = 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖,𝐻0)                                                                                       
(12) ES: 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖 + 𝐸𝑆𝑖 ,𝐻0) = 𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖,𝐻1)                                                                                       
In the model above 𝑑𝐻 is a positive change (a proposed small increase in ‘non-exposure to 
radiation), thus CS = WTP reflects an amount of money to pay in order to secure this change, 
while ES = WTA is a required compensation for this change not occurring. If 𝑑𝐻 was 
negative (for example, an additional nuclear reactor to be put into operation involving higher 
health risks), CS = WTA would reflect a necessary compensation for this change, while ES = 
WTP would be a sum of money to pay in order to avoid the change. Due to several problems 
the application of WTA involves, its use in practice is sometimes considered to be 
undesirable.5 It does not matter which measure, CS or ES, to use if the project is marginal in 
the sense that MWTP in (4) can be considered constant. But if the project is large enough, the 
difference between CS and ES arises due to the fact that MWTP is no longer constant with 
respect to the project. Therefore in this case it is important which measure of the two to 
choose. Accordingly, a discrepancy between WTP and WTA takes place. Certain implications 
of the difference between WTP and WTA will be considered in section 5.2 under the 
discussion of monetary valuation of human life. 
Since WTP is central to the cost-benefit framework, it has to be calculated because it is not 
directly available in the market. Different estimation techniques are therefore used to elicit it. 
The most widely applied methods, relevant for this thesis, are contingent valuation (CV) and 
hedonic pricing (HP) (for detailed discussion of these methods see e.g. Perman et al., 2003; 
Johansson, 1993; Carson and Hanemann, 2005; Rosen, 1974).  
The CV is a method that involves directly asking people about their WTP. Preferences for a 
proposed policy change or a project, derived by means of this method, are thus called ‘stated’. 
The HP is an indirect method used to come by ‘revealed’ preferences. For example, the 
hedonic pricing method is used to calculate a monetary value of human life. In this case, the 
method involves implicit estimation of the wage increase demanded by workers to accept 
higher risk to their health. 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Carson and Hanemann (2005), Perman et al. (2003) for the discussion. 
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To conclude this part, it is reasonable to highlight some important points concerning the cost-
benefit framework which imply certain consequences for the acceptability of CBA as a tool of 
policy analysis: 
1. The use of CBA requires the monetary valuation of the impacts of a project to make 
its benefits and costs comparable. However, it might be difficult to put a price on 
some goods (such as human health and life) because these goods are not available in 
the market.   
2. There is no suggestion that a SWF provides some kind of scientific measure of 
society's ‘well-being’; it simply represents the preferences of the planner (Drèze and 
Stern, 1987, p 933). 
3. A SWF is not observable. There are at least two fundamental aspects of this problem 
to be faced in any application. First, the estimation of the welfare weights, 𝑤𝑖, in 
equation (10) above. Second, the unobservability of the individual utility functions 
(Johansson, 1993, p 21). 
4. In applied CBA explicit welfare weights 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑋𝑖𝑖  consistent with the ethical views of a 
decision maker are rarely used (Nyborg and Spangen, 2000, p 84). 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑋𝑖
𝑖  are usually 
assumed to be equal across individuals. Distributional issues are thereby ignored.   
5. “There is no commonly accepted method of measuring cardinal, interpersonally 
comparable well-being; in particular, the problem of interpersonal comparisons seems 
difficult to overcome” (Nyborg, 1996, p 69). Consequently, decision makers using the 
recommendations of CBA have to accept WTP as a cardinal and interpersonally 
comparable measure of individual well-being.  
6. An important ambiguity with the potential Pareto criterion is that it remains vague on 
whether a (potential) Pareto improvement will actually be implemented. “If no such 
guarantee exists, then the criterion is certainly unacceptable” (Drèze and Stern, 1987, 
p 957). 
7. “In fact, the policy use of the Pareto criterion goes beyond welfarism and embraces 
consequentialism as well, since choices of actions, institutions, etc, are all required to 
satisfy Pareto optimality, so that consequentialism is implicitly but firmly demanded” 
(Sen, 1987, p 39). 
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3. Cost-benefit analysis: introducing risk 
In practice the consequences of a radiation-related project are not known in advance, and the 
analyst deals with risk and uncertainty. I will draw the line between the concepts of risk and 
uncertainty in section 5.3. For the moment, I use them interchangeably. I also assume that 
probabilities somehow can be assigned to a complete list of alternative outcomes of the 
project. Let us now assume that in the model, introduced in part 2, each individual i faces an 
uncertain quality of the public good ‘non-exposure to radiation’. Each individual’s income is 
assumed to be known with certainty. Due to the presence of risk, monetary measures of utility 
change 𝑑𝑈𝑖 can thus be infinite in number. But for simplicity H is assumed to take on a finite 
number of values. The question arises how the analyst can come by a money measure of 
change in utility to use it in a CBA of the project. 
I focus on the expected utility approach to the modeling of behavior under uncertainty. 
Following Johansson (1993, p 134), there is a probability distribution assigning probabilities 
𝑝1, … ,𝑝𝑚 to different states of nature 𝐻1, … ,𝐻𝑚, with 𝑝𝑗 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑚, and ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑗 =1. Thus instead of the function in (1), p.9, individual i maximizes their well-behaved expected 
utility function (for notation simplicity I drop the superscript i):  
𝑈𝐸 = E[𝑈(𝑋,𝐻)] = ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑚𝑗=1 𝑈�𝑋,𝐻𝑗� 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛   
where E is the expectation operator. 
The following discussion, including the figure below, follows that of Perman et al. (2003, pp 
448-449). As discussed in Perman et al., in practice the typical individual is assumed to be 
risk-averse because taking a risk is costly in utility terms. Figure 3.1 shows the main aspects 
of risk aversion. The shape of the utility function captures risk aversion behavior. 
Mathematically,  𝑈𝑋 > 0, 𝑈𝑋𝑋 < 0, i.e. the expected utility is increasing in income (the first-
order derivative is positive), but at a decreasing rate (the second-order derivative is negative). 
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Suppose now that there are only two possible states of nature: either a situation H1 where the 
quality of the public good ‘non-exposure to radiation’ is high or a situation H2 where the 
quality is low. However, it is not known for sure whether high quality will be available or not.   
The low quality of the public good ‘non-exposure to radiation’ H1 happens with probability 
p1; and the individual enjoys the high quality H2 with probability 1 – p1. As Figure 3.1 is 
drawn, p1 = 0.5. This probability determines the expected value of the individual’s 
compensating surplus as willingness to pay for the higher quality:  
  
U 
H2 
H1 
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option value (OV) 
 
Expected value of the compensating surplus, E[CS] 
 
Option price (OP) 
 
 
  
Figure 3.1 Risk aversion 
U (H2) 
U (H1) 
X 
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E[CS] = 𝑋2 − 𝑋∗∗ 
Thus X** is the expected value of the outcome for the given probability, and X* is its certainty 
equivalent. The amount of money 𝑋2 − 𝑋∗is known as ‘option price’ (OP), the maximum 
WTP for an option which guarantees the high quality of the public good ‘non-exposure to 
radiation’. The difference between X** and X* is thus an ‘option value’ (OV) which can be 
defined as a risk aversion premium. According to Johansson (1993, p 142), the expected value 
of the compensating surplus measure, as well as the concept of option value, must be used 
with great care in CBA because E[CS] alone would understate the benefits of the public good 
H since the risk-averse individual is willing to pay a risk aversion premium 𝑋∗∗ − 𝑋∗  to avoid 
the risk. I will return to this point in section 5.2. 
Concluding this part, it is reasonable to emphasize three important points. First, in practice the 
analysts encounter risk and uncertainty since the consequences of radiation-related projects 
cannot be treated as certain. Second, individuals are usually assumed to be risk averse. Third, 
under uncertainty and due to the presence of risk-aversion behavior, great care is needed to 
put a price on the non-marketed public goods such as ‘non-exposure to radiation’ for the 
purposes of CBA.      
 
4. Specifics of radioactivity 
Radiation has its specifics when considered as an economic good or service. On the one hand, 
nuclear power plants can generate huge amounts of relatively cheap and climate friendly 
energy, thereby improving on people’s well-being by means of pushing up electricity 
provision, heat, employment, and progress. On the other hand, nuclear power plants are 
associated with adverse life and health effects connected to nuclear-waste repositories, 
radiation leak, and catastrophes. Ahearne (2000, p 769) states: “The use of nuclear reactors 
can ameliorate climate change and bring electricity to developing nations; but the associated 
waste problems will remain a nagging concern until publicly acceptable solutions are found. 
These may come about through improved technology, changed understanding of radioactive 
risks, or finding new disposal sites.” 
Hence, radioactivity can be perceived as either a good or a bad depending on whether it 
potentially improves or worsens individuals’ well-being. Many studies have shown that public 
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perception and acceptance of exposure to radioactivity is determined by the context in which 
radiation is used. I refrain from reproducing the numerous results of those surveys and refer to 
Slovic (2000, pp 264-269). But just to reveal the discrepancy between various perceptions of 
radioactivity it is relevant to give one result which has been obtained by many researchers. 
Medical uses of radioactivity (such as X-rays) are perceived in a very favorable way, while 
perceptions of nuclear power and nuclear waste are highly negative. Hence, in the former case 
radioactivity is believed to be a good (a benefit); in the latter case, it is perceived as a bad (a 
risk). 
In what follows, I will stick to nuclear power as a source of energy, on the one hand, and a 
source of radiation exposure which is perceived to entail adverse health effects, on the other 
hand. This source of radioactivity is especially interesting because the views of technical 
experts often contrast greatly with the views of the general public. In most situations, the 
former attach a moderate and acceptable risk to the nuclear power and nuclear waste while the 
latter perceive the level of risk as extreme and unacceptable (Slovic, 2000, p 267). 
As discussed in Slovic (2000), a lot of surveys, conducted to assess public attitudes and 
opinions regarding the management of high-level radioactive wastes, have resulted in an 
almost uniformly negative picture. In these surveys negative subcategories such as 
‘dangerous/toxic, death/sickness, environmental damage, bad/negative and scary’ dominated 
significantly. A general category labeled ‘positive’ accounted for only 1% of the images. 
Other positive associations, ‘necessary’, ‘employment’, and ‘money/income’ amounted to 
only 2.5% of the images (p 278).      
Moreover, public perceptions of technological hazards gave rise to such a phenomenon as 
‘stigmatization of technologies’. The word ‘stigma’ denotes something ‘marked’ as deviant, 
flawed, spoiled or generally undesirable in the view of some observer (Slovic, 2000, p 270). 
Gregory et al. (1996) claim that technologies have become avoided by the public not just due 
to standard perceptions of risk, but because a positive condition or expectation has been 
overturned. Thus, they argue (p 216): “(…) stigma represents an increasingly significant 
factor affecting people’s perceptions of their health and influencing the acceptance of 
scientific and technological innovations.” 
In addition, it must be mentioned that exposure to radiation might have adverse health 
impacts on human health. The special feature of many radiation-related health effects is that 
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the target health risk can have a long latency period, i.e. decades can pass before the related 
disease manifests itself (such as cancer). One of the recent studies of nuclear workers in 15 
countries has revealed that an excess risk of cancer exists even at the low doses of radiation 
(Cardis et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, in the context of adverse health effects due to radioactivity, a normative 
question arises whether it is permissible to weigh the good health against other objectives 
such as money, consumption, etc. (Zweifel et al., 2009, p 10). In addition, some experts try to 
justify the application of CBA to radiation-related projects on the rational grounds, assuming 
that radiation risks are equivalent to risks from travelling by car (Dunster, 1973). 
In my opinion, weighing health against money under the assumption of well-behaved 
individual utility functions may be problematic, when it comes to possible adverse radiation-
related health effects. It may be hypothetically acceptable to apply CV techniques to elicit 
WTP provided that a person can self choose whether to sacrifice a certain amount of his 
health in favor of other goods, i.e. when substitution opportunities are open to this person. 
Just for example, a person can decide whether to buy cigarettes or to pay instead for medical 
treatment in order to get rid of smoking addiction. In this case one can regard health as a 
consumption good, which can be substituted for another good. And risk to health, imposed on 
the individual, can be considered as a voluntary one.  
On the other hand, when it comes to such issues as radioactive contamination, the same 
person faces an involuntary risk to his health. He cannot avoid it by his own free will due to 
the fact that this risk comes as a possible negative external effect of decisions made by other 
people, and it is related to uncertain states of nature. In this latter case, health and 
consumption may not be substitutes. Rather, they may turn into complements because health 
fulfils a ‘production’ function, i.e. it determines person’s ability to produce consumption 
goods. Thus, it might be impossible to weigh health against other objectives. 
Slovic (2000, p 269) argues that whether or not decision makers share public risk perceptions, 
they cannot be ignored. Thus, information about public risk perceptions of nuclear power 
radiation cannot be disregarded in decision-making processes. Whether or not CBA succeeds 
in providing decision makers with such information will be discussed below in section 5.3.  
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5. Methodological weaknesses of cost-benefit analysis and suggested 
improvements 
Many critical remarks on CBA as a tool of policy analysis are conveniently summarized by 
Zerbe and Bellas (2006, p 17). For example, CBA rests on monetary values, it does not 
consider the income distribution, moral values are neglected, CBA is not voting, etc. As long 
as the list of methodological problems of applied CBA can be quite long, it is not possible to 
cover them all here. Therefore, I focus on a few problems particularly relevant to radiation-
related projects. Distributional issues in decision making, limitations to the monetary 
valuation of human life and health, and the question of uncertainty, risk perceptions and risk 
regulation in nuclear power will be discussed in this part of the thesis.  
 
5.1. Distributional concerns in decision making 
In guidelines for preparing economic analyses, efficiency and distributional issues are usually 
approached separately. For example, USEPA (2000, pp 139-140) specifies that calculation of 
net benefits in CBA helps judge about efficiency of a project; two other ways – an economic 
impact analysis and an equity assessment – are aimed at providing information about the 
distributional effects of the project. The guidelines for social economic analyses applied in 
Norway state that “weighing of distributional effects and possible conflicts of interests is a 
political issue lying outside the social economic analysis” (Ministry of Finance, 2005, p 11).6  
Economists tend to justify the disregard of distributional aspects in applied CBA by the 
separation of efficiency and equity considerations. As stated at the end of part 2 (p 13), 
explicit welfare weights aimed at incorporating decision makers’ distributional concerns are 
not often used in applied CBA. Economists emphasize their responsibility for providing 
decision makers with recommendations on efficiency grounds (the potential Pareto 
improvement criterion), and leave distributional concerns to policy makers. As defined in 
Perman et al. (2003, p 116), “it is a separate matter, for government, to decide whether 
compensation should actually occur, and to arrange for it to occur if it is thought desirable.”  
                                                 
6 Throughout the thesis the translation from Norwegian into English is mine.  
20 
 
With this view taken for granted, economists focus on maximization of aggregate well-being 
based on several assumptions that allow ignoring distributional issues. In particular, they 
assume that costless redistribution of income is feasible. However, economic efficiency and 
equity considerations cannot be separated in a “second-best world” where government is not 
able to carry out non-distortionary taxation of the project winners in order to transfer these tax 
revenues to project losers adversely affected by the project (Loomis, 2011, p 3). Thus the 
assumption about lump-sum transfers has been recognized as implausible (Drèze and Stern, 
1987; Loomis, 2011). Johansson-Stenman (2005) investigates whether introducing 
distributional weights into CBA is redundant, and whether it can imply large efficiency 
losses. He argues that such perceptions are incorrect and misleading, and shows that 
distributional weights are ‘second-best’ optimal to use.   
Another assumption, used to justify the disregard of distributional issues, rests on the ethical 
grounds of utilitarianism. In applied CBA social welfare is often assumed to depend only on 
the underlying individual utility levels (‘welfarism’). According to Sen (1987), such narrowed 
‘welfarism’ must be extended by ‘consequentialism’ considerations. Sen argues: “The case 
for consequential reasoning arises from the fact that activities have consequences. (…) To 
ignore consequences is to leave an ethical story half told.” (p 75) Intuitively, ignoring the 
distributional aspects of a project is conceptually the same thing as disregard for the rights of 
the affected people who may be particularly vulnerable to the consequences of the project’s 
implementation. 
As long as CBA is grounded in a highly controversial task of measuring WTP (I will 
approach this question in section 5.2), its application to a radiation-related project can 
intensify the importance of distributional concerns if the implementation of such a project 
entails a biased distribution of negative health effects. Intuitively, the ignored problem of 
income inequalities may in its turn lead to an unfair distribution of radiation health risks. If 
the rich people enjoy higher WTP to avoid nuclear waste sites, nuclear waste repositories are 
very likely to be located in the areas populated by the poor people who have lower WTP to 
avoid them. To the point, Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, p 150) argue: 
“It is no coincidence that pollution so often accompanies poverty. Imagine a CBA of 
siting an undesirable facility, such as a landfill or incinerator. Benefits are often 
measured by willingness to pay for environmental improvement. Wealthy 
communities are able and willing to pay more for the benefit of not having the facility 
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in their backyards; thus the net benefits to society as a whole will be maximized by 
putting the facility in a low-income area. (Wealthy communities do not actually have 
to pay for the benefit of avoiding the facility; the analysis depends only on the fact that 
they are willing to pay.)”  
Once the necessity to account for efficiency and distributional concerns in CBA 
simultaneously is recognized (Johansson-Stenman, 2005, p 349), the question arises how to 
do that. “In practice, developing a universally acceptable social welfare function is difficult 
because it requires explicit decisions to be made about society's preferences for the 
distribution of resources” (USEPA, 2000, p 141). However, it has been admitted that 
potentially a SWF can be used to evaluate efficiency-equity trade-off by incorporating the 
effects on distribution from economic impact analysis and/or equity assessment (USEPA, 
2000, p 140). In particular, an equity assessment can provide information on how policies 
affect specific groups (sub-populations).  
Nyborg (1996, pp 11-12) notes that providing information on groups can be useful only if 
decision makers agree that the welfare weights within each group are not significantly 
different. Moreover, she emphasizes that the main challenge for the analyst will be to decide 
on the considerations which are important to determine subjective welfare weights, i.e. 𝑤𝑖𝑈𝑋𝑖
𝑖  
in equation (10) in Part 2. Nyborg believes that in any case, it is more useful to provide a 
distribution-concerned decision maker with group information than “simply a number telling 
her whether an analyst holds a project to be socially desirable or not” (p 84). 
Loomis (2011, p 5) argues that “the more explicit the weights are, the more there is room for 
disagreement regarding the value judgments that underlie these weights.” Therefore, he points 
out that the economists are supposed “to help steer decision makers away from obvious 
pitfalls that can arise with the use of weights. Some weighting schemes by being very explicit 
may be more controversial than others.” He considers several approaches to incorporate 
distribution and equity concerns in CBA, such as implicit weighing by decision makers (on 
the basis of the benefits and costs disaggregated by group characteristics), explicit weighing 
of net benefits, Lorenz curve based approaches, etc. With regard to assigning different explicit 
weights to the net benefits of each group, Loomis emphasizes that it is useful to display the 
original benefits and costs as well for the purposes of sensitivity analysis. Showing weighted 
and unweighted net benefits together can facilitate the understanding of efficiency and 
distributional aspects of a project or policy. Monetary net benefits can in principle be 
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weighted by some measure of marginal utility each group receives from its net benefits, for 
example, by the marginal utility of income.  
However, Christiansen (1983) shows that the marginal utility of income, attached as weight to 
the net benefit of a particular individual, is not exclusively a function of utility levels. It can 
vary with other external factors, such as changes in relative prices. Thus once these external 
parameters change, weights change as well. Furthermore, provided two individuals have 
different sets of such external parameters, even if their utility functions are the same, their 
weights may differ. 
In practice equal welfare weight 𝑤𝑖 is assigned to all individuals’ income changes on the 
assumption that individuals have the same marginal utility of income, even though the later 
assumption cannot be empirically verified (Medin et al., 2001, p 398). Furthermore, Nyborg 
(1996, p 18) states that if the rich people have a lower marginal utility of income, ignoring the 
use of explicit welfare weights can lead to the systematic bias towards the utilities of the rich 
people in applied CBA.  
Further, in CBA the sum of individual net benefits which is regarded as the social net benefit 
is expressed in monetary units. An obvious argument for the choice of money as a numéraire 
may be the Pareto criterion: money allows the project winners to compensate the project 
losers. However, Brekke (1997) shows that when it comes to public goods, the numéraire 
matters, and that different numéraires will systematically give an advantage to different 
interest groups. He argues that the less valuable the numéraire to an individual, the more will 
their interest weigh in the sum of net benefits. Thus the choice of numéraire is equivalent to a 
particular choice of welfare weights. It is reasonable to suggest that a decision maker that 
regards some natural unit as the appropriate unit of aggregation will find CBA 
recommendations, which are based on a monetary evaluation of the social net benefit, hardly 
useful. Drèze (1998, p 485) emphasizes that the only plausible thing to do is to use 
appropriate welfare weights. 
Medin et al. (2001) investigate further on the numéraire issue by using the information from 
different contingent valuation surveys. They find that the choice of numéraire turns out to be 
extremely important, i.e. the sum of net benefits appears to be highly sensitive to a particular 
way of comparing interpersonal utility changes. Supposing a public good is used as a 
numéraire, Medin et al. show that if one assumes equal marginal utility of the public good, 
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instead of the conventional assumption of equal marginal utility of income, the sum of 
monetary net benefits is reduced by a factor of between 2 and 307 (p 406). Thus they 
conclude that making empirically unverifiable assumptions, such as equal marginal utility of 
income for everyone, introduces an element of arbitrariness into applied CBA.    
On the grounds that the applicability of CBA to the monetary valuation of human health is 
limited, cost-effectiveness analysis is often proposed as an alternative to CBA to overcome 
the distribution problem.7 For example, Ministry of Finance (2005, p 56) state: “It is more 
challenging to apply CBA, which is based on WTP, in the health sector (…) since this often 
leads to difficult ethical trade-offs. (…) The use of aggregated individual WTP as a decision-
making criterion is ethically challenging when a distinct individual knows that he or she needs 
treatment. In this case, it is not clear whether the weight put on the WTP in the risk group 
should be higher than in the society on the whole. This problem becomes especially difficult 
to settle if the society also puts an emphasis on the distribution of health goods irrespective of 
the income distribution.” Hence, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis is recommended in the 
health sector since the benefits of different alternatives are similar in kind, and the aim is thus 
to minimize the costs. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) ranks the alternatives according to lowest costs per unit of 
health gain, which is often measured in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) (for 
theoretical aspects of CEA and the concept of QALYs (see e.g. Zweifel et al., 2009; Nord, 
1999). The derivation of QALYs is conducted in the following way. Using interviews, utility 
weights for the various health states are determined. For this purpose, the weight for the state 
of perfect health is calibrated to the value 1, while the state of death is assigned the value 0. 
Using these values, a year spent in the respective health state is weighted to obtain QALYs. 
The main attractiveness of CEA is that health benefits are expressed in natural units such as 
number of cases of disease prevented, number of lives saved, or number of life years gained, 
which most people can easily understand and intuitively accept as measures of value (Nord, 
1999, p 4). 
CEA is appropriate when the objective is that to maximize health, irrespective of how health 
benefits are distributed across individuals (Olsen, 1997, p 603). Wagstaff (1991, p 26) argues 
that even though QALYs are not based on individual’s valuation of their health, health 
                                                 
7 Here I am mainly concerned with the distributional issues. The aspects of monetary valuation of human life and health will 
be addressed in section 5.2 of the thesis. 
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maximization and utilitarianism are “close bedfellows”: like utilitarianism, health 
maximization entails reallocation of resources in favor of those who have a higher capacity to 
benefit from health. He investigates the issue of justifying the health maximization approach 
in literature. One of the explanations, he finds, states, for example, that since a QALY is 
regarded as being of equal value to everybody, the health outcome via QALYs is 
automatically equitable (p 27). However, such an assumption of ‘distributive neutrality’, as 
defined by Nord (1999), does not work because the distribution of health gains does matter 
(Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004, pp 100-101; Nord, 1999, p 22; Olsen, 1997, p 603; 
Wagstaff, 1991; Zweifel et al., 2009, p 19).  
As it was discussed above, Brekke (1997, p 117) argues that in CBA “the choice of money as 
a numéraire is systematically favorable to those who value money the least, relative to 
alternative numéraires.” Drèze (1998, p 487) confirms that this remark will be relevant to the 
social evaluation of different types of public goods, including health. Interestingly, Donaldson 
et al. (2002) in their turn show that income is an important determinant of non-monetary 
valuations of health outcomes, such as QALYs. Hence, “methods of valuation that 
incorporate non-monetary methods of valuing health consequences share the same ‘ethical 
concerns’ of WTP, even though they are usually overlooked in CEA studies” (p 66). Thus, 
they conclude that the choice of CEA as an alternative to CBA cannot be justified on the 
grounds of avoiding distributional concerns.  
Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, p 100) claim that “QALYs will never provide a good 
measure of the value of health or a reliable standard for shaping public health policy”, 
because the aim to maximize total health benefits (total QALY gains), regardless of how they 
are distributed, clashes with an important aspect of equity in health in at least three ways. 
First, it ignores the severity of the disease. According to Ackerman and Heinzerling, a 
comparative study found that QALYs give much greater importance to minor complaints, and 
relatively less importance to death, than other methods of valuation. Second, the QALY 
approach discriminates against the disabled by putting a lower value on their lives. Third, 
QALY calculations discriminate on the age grounds: to treat the elderly turns out to be 
generally “worth” less, because they have so few years left to be saved.  
Revesz and Livermore (2008, pp 89-90) assert that it is wrong to ask healthy people, ex ante, 
to evaluate various health states. They emphasize a phenomenon – response shift or 
adaptation – that has puzzled the researchers, because people suffering from very serious 
25 
 
diseases – like cancer – often continue to report relatively high qualities of life. According to 
Revesz and Livermore, the serious problem with the QALY approach is that it disregards the 
ability of people to adapt to negative health conditions. As a result, the quality of life of 
people with illnesses and disabilities appears to be systematically undervalued. 
Nord (1999, p 22) states that QALYs can in principle be assigned equity weights to 
incorporate distributional concerns. However, he argues that under the QALY approach, it 
nevertheless may not be feasible to measure health benefits in terms of individual utility in the 
case of health improvements that either are of moderate size or consist in saving people’s 
lives. To the point, Olsen (1991, 2000) suggests that there might be other preferences beyond 
those which are taken into account within the current health outcome measures (QALYs). He 
provides an example of preferences concerning the nature of the proposed health-related 
projects: Risk-averse people may prefer a life-saving project with a low probability of success 
to an alternative project with high probability and low gain, although the expected number of 
QALYs is lower for the former.  
It seems useful to conclude section 5.1 by addressing cases A and B introduced in part 1 (p 4). 
The distributional concerns are explicitly ignored in applied CBA under the assumptions of 
costless lump-sum transfers and certain ethical considerations. However, these assumptions 
do not work in reality, thus efficiency and distribution cannot be treated on a separate basis. If 
we accept the assumption that the rich have a lower marginal utility of income, the disregard 
of explicit welfare weights favors the utilities of the rich people. In particular, ignoring 
welfare weights might result in an unfair distribution of health risks due to the implementation 
of a radiation-related project.  
Once the necessity to incorporate distributional concerns into applied CBA is recognized, the 
question arises how to do that. On the one hand, the use of the marginal utility of income as a 
weight is difficult to achieve. On the other hand, the use of equal marginal utility of income 
across individuals appears to be empirically unverifiable. CEA, proposed as an alternative to 
CBA in order to deal with the distribution problem, does not improve on these grounds. 
Regarding case A, it seems reasonable to conclude that the separation of efficiency and 
distributional considerations does not allow judging about the social desirability of a 
radiation-related project on the basis of CBA recommendations. Similarly, for case B, 
decision makers will hardly regard CBA as a useful informational background for debates 
about the project and the consequences of its implementation.    
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With regard to case B, Nyborg (1996, p 19) in particular points out that the ignored 
distributional concerns do represent a problem for the use of CBA as an informational input. 
She also emphasizes that if equal weight on all income changes cannot be justified on the 
ethical grounds, the question arises whether decision makers will find the results of CBA 
useful at all. 
 
5.2. Limitations to the monetary valuation of human life and health 
For most people life is priceless (Zweifel et al., 2009, p 17). Ackerman and Heinzerling 
(2004, p 9) state that this idea does not mean that an infinite amount of money is needed to 
protect human life and health; rather, it is to say that translating life and health into money 
units is not a fruitful way to protect them. Irrespective of any ethical considerations, Broome 
(1978, p 92) notes that any attempt to attach a value to a human life is doomed to failure since 
“no finite amount of money could compensate a person for the loss of his life, simply because 
money is no good to him when he is dead.” Willinger (2001, p 4) argues: “The technical 
debate about whether monetary equivalents are an appropriate measure is irrelevant if the 
viewpoint is taken that health or life cannot be valued. Such a position may be supported on 
the basis that rights to health and life are fundamental human rights. If environmental quality 
is a necessary condition for maintaining these rights, it is therefore itself a fundamental 
human right. Bargaining these rights in the market place, as CBA does, is then unacceptable”. 
Conducting CBA requires placing a monetary value on a human life in order to make the 
expected benefits of the project and its expected costs comparable. A skillful monetary 
valuation of human life and health is an extremely challenging task to perform because there 
are no prices of lives and health directly available in the market.   
Following Johansson (1995, p 60), under the assumption that no income can compensate for 
the loss of one’s life, it is impossible to detect a WTP such that a particular individual 
becomes indifferent between being alive (z1) and being dead (z0). This amounts to saying that 
the utility of being in state z1 will always be higher than the utility of being in state z0. Thus, 
if one introduces a variable z, for every individual i the following inequality can never be 
turned into equality:    
𝑉𝑖(0, 𝑧1) > 𝑉𝑖�𝑋𝑖, 𝑧0�  for  𝑋𝑖 > 0, where 𝑋𝑖 is individual i’s income.   
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Since putting a price on the life of a particular individual is impossible, the analysts consider a 
marginal project of increasing probability of death, but they leave this probability in the open 
interval (0, 1). And under an additional assumption, 𝑉𝑖(𝑋𝑖, 𝑧0) = 0, the compensation needed 
to accept a reduction in survival probability thus becomes finite.8  
The indicated assumptions make the valuation of a change in mortality (or morbidity) 
consistent with the concept of statistical life (Johansson, 1995, p 61). If there are n affected 
individuals and a project saves b lives, i.e. reduces the mortality risk by b/n, the value of a 
statistical life (VOSL) can be calculated in the following manner: 
𝑉𝑂𝑆𝐿 = ∑ 𝐶𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑖=1
𝑏
 
where 𝐶𝑆𝑖 stands for the affected individual’s marginal compensating surplus (equivalent to 
the individual’s 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖 for the risk reduction. Thus WTP for a proposed small change in risk is 
the key element to derive VOSL. For this purpose, as it was briefly discussed in Part 2, the 
two methods – hedonic pricing (HP) and the contingent valuation method (CV) – are used.  
The HP – a method based on revealed-preference studies – is often considered as a ‘gold 
standard’ (Revesz and Livermore, 2008, p 93) due to the fact that it allows deriving CS from 
individuals’ actual behavior. Namely, if the analyst considers wage differentials in jobs with 
different exposures to risk, the premium needed to induce workers to undertake jobs with a 
higher risk provides an estimate of monetary value of a marginal change in risk to health and 
life. One of the problems with the HP method is that the information about occupational risks, 
which is available to the workers, may be imperfect, i.e. the individuals may not be fully 
aware of the accident risks they actually face (Ackerman and Heinzerling, 2004, p 70; OECD, 
2006, p 94). Consequently, the estimates of the value of a risk may be biased since the wage 
differentials do not reflect the individuals’ true valuation of avoiding the risk. Another 
problem with the use of the HP method is that the study of wage differentials for long-latency 
diseases, such as cancer, is generally highly unreliable (Revesz and Livermore, 2008, p 99).  
The CV method has been largely accepted for estimating the monetary value of non-market 
effects of projects and policies (OECD, 2006, p 123). The practical use of the CV method for 
eliciting WTP to determine VOSL is a rather controversial issue in itself; therefore, I refrain 
                                                 
8 Profound discussion of evaluating changes in mortality can be found in Johansson (1995). 
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from discussing it here.9 The CV method is regarded by some experts as most consistent with 
consumer sovereignty perspective10 as compared to the QALY method (Olsen, 1997, p 604), 
which was introduced in part 5.1 under the discussion of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) as 
an alternative to CBA on the distributional grounds.  Returning to CEA, it is relevant to 
emphasize that this method is considered to have an advantage in health-related issues thanks 
to the use of natural units, which allows overcoming the problem of monetary valuation 
inherent in CBA. The point is that CEA can only be used to compare projects with 
homogeneous outcomes (Zweifel et al., 2009, p 24). Therefore several attempts have been 
made to link WTP and QALYs for the purposes of economic evaluations on the basis of CBA 
(see e.g. Johannesson, 1995). However, other analysts assert that these attempts are 
implausible because CEA and CBA are based on fundamentally different ethical grounds (see 
e.g. Dolan and Edlin, 2002; Kenkel, 1997). 
According to OECD (2006, p 196), there are three important aspects of VOSL: (1) the 
validity of VOSL; (2) the size of VOSL; and (3) the relevance of VOSL to all kinds of risks. 
The validity of VOSL relates to its sensitivity to underlying determinants. For example, OECD 
(2006, p 197) states that there might be some background (not policy-related) individual risks, 
which can interfere with the correct estimation of VOSL through their influence on WTP and 
which may be difficult to separate from the risk that individuals are asked about in a CV 
survey. Moreover, as it is pointed out in OECD (2006), the assumption that WTP varies 
proportionally to risk reduction does not work in reality. For example, Alberini et al. (2004) 
show that people with cancer are willing to pay even more for reduction in mortality risk. 
Krüger and Svensson (2009) found that the magnitude of option value (OV) (risk aversion 
premium discussed in part 3 of the thesis) is a significant determinant of VOSL. They 
demonstrate for a public policy investment in road safety, reducing mortality risk, that when 
in CV surveys uncertainty whether the risk reduction will actually take place or not is 
explicitly emphasized, the OV might become higher. Krüger and Svensson state that OV is of 
such a considerable magnitude that applied CBA cannot ignore it, which is generally the case, 
as they highlight it (p 564). This amounts to saying that E[CS] cannot necessarily be regarded 
as the maximum WTP for the proposed reduction in risk.  Treich (2010) shows that ambiguity 
                                                 
9 For the discussion see e.g. Perman et al. (2003), Carson and Hanemann (2005), OECD (2006).  
10 Consumer sovereignty means that every individual is the best judge of their own well being. 
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aversion that arises from scientific uncertainty, lack of information and other factors, 
increases the value of VOSL.     
Regarding the size of VOSL, it is important to point out that the HP method usually produces 
higher estimates of VOSL than the CV method, mainly for two reasons: (1) occupational risks 
tend to be higher than public risks; and (2) the HP measures WTA, not WTP (OECD, 2006, p 
201). Here I will touch upon the second point in the context of the discrepancy between WTP 
and WTA measures (theoretical aspects of this problem were considered in part 2 of the 
thesis). The main point is that WTA usually exceeds WTP. However, the choice of the 
measure might be significant for evaluation of risk-related projects.  
Carson and Hanemann (2005, p 907) emphasize: “If total value, in an economic sense, can 
always be expressed in terms of WTP and WTA and the two measures differ substantially, 
either theoretically or empirically, the appropriate measure for a benefit–cost analysis depends 
upon the property right.” It is equivalent to saying that if an individual is entitled to a 
reduction in risk, the relevant measure is WTA this reduction foregone; if there is no such 
entitlement, the suitable measure is WTP to secure this reduction in risk (Willinger, 2005, p 
11). Strictly speaking, a property right to the initial situation is decisive. However, OECD 
(2006, p 158) states that the legal right could be assigned to the proposed change or to the 
future state of the environment, and that WTA to forego that right becomes thus the relevant 
valuation measure.  
Imagine a hypothetical project that involves an additional reactor to be put into operation at 
the nuclear power plant in some area. If the project is implemented, the society of risk-averse 
people in the area face a potential risk of losing their future earnings as a result of an illness or 
death due to exposure to radiation. The affected people can be entitled to state their WTA an 
increase in risk, rather than WTP for risk reduction. Determining the property rights is not 
that straightforward in practice (OECD, 2006, p 158). However, in the age that left slavery 
behind, when developed democratic institutions are in place, every person has an inalienable 
“property” right to their life and health. A proposition like “no paper contract – no right” 
would hardly be appropriate here. Therefore WTA for the increased risk is likely to be a more 
relevant measure here. 
Knetsch (1990) investigates the implications of the discrepancy between WTP and WTA for 
decision making. He points out that the choice of a measure is not that a question of property 
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rights as such. He notes instead that the choice of an appropriate measure cannot ignore the 
fact that people ascribe different values to gains and losses: “(…) instead of comparing 
alternative end states, people usually evaluate gains and losses in terms of changes from some 
reference position. And they value losses from this neutral point much more than they do 
gains beyond it” (p 228). Knetsch emphasizes that there is a ‘kink’ in the utility function at 
the reference point, thus this function is not that well-behaved, as it is assumed. Knetsch 
argues that if a proposed change imposes losses on individuals, the welfare changes based on 
WTP will likely to be underestimated; consequently, the results of CBA will be biased: an 
accounting of the sums people are willing to pay to avoid the risk would likely greatly 
underestimate the costs (p 231).  
Similarly, Willinger (2001, p 11) states that according to the psychological findings, large 
disparities between WTP and WTA are justified by individuals’ ‘loss aversion’ behavior 
(‘loss aversion’ is discussed by Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Individuals are more inclined 
to minimize losses (with respect to a “reference point”, discussed above) than to maximize 
gains.  Willinger thus concludes that in the case of an increase in risk, an individual suffers a 
loss in their well-being as well as a loss in their initial entitlement to a reduced risk; 
consequently, an appropriate measure is WTA. 
Regarding the relevance of VOSL to all kinds of risks, for the purposes of this paper it makes 
sense to point out that WTP to avoid cancer may be higher than other diseases, i.e. a cancer 
premia is required (OECD, 2006, p 215). According to one recent Canadian survey 
concerning water-related health conditions, the mortality risk reduction values appear not 
significantly different for cancer and microbials only for an equal spread of risk reductions 
(Adamowicz et al., 2011). When Adamowicz et al. introduce 25-year cancer latency, they find 
out that WTP to avoid cancer increases and it becomes significantly greater than WTP to 
avoid death from microbials. Thus VOSL for cancer-related risks might be higher.         
The analysts often distinguish between ‘ex ante’ valuation and ‘ex post’ valuation. The ex 
ante view is prior to outcomes of the project; the ex post perspective is when the outcomes of 
the project are known (Perman et al., 2003, p 449). Broome (1978) claims that ‘ex ante’ 
valuation cannot be justified because it deliberately and unfairly uses the individual’s 
ignorance about a final outcome: it does not seem correct to fix different values on the death 
of a particular person (infinite value) and an unknown person (VOSL).  
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Similarly, Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, p 68) state that the concept of VOSL 
unfoundedly replaces the concept of life itself: the analysts ignore the distinction between 
valuing risk and valuing life, and act as if they generate the latter. They also argue that 
reliance on VOSL does not allow making important decisions about priceless values, and that 
it is more reasonable to exploit one’s intuitive judgments to find a correct policy choice (p 
90).   
Indeed, decision makers may find monetary values of non-marketed goods confusing and 
difficult to interpret. Nyborg (1998) provides the results of an interview with 16 members of 
the Norwegian Parliament concerning their attitudes toward the use of CBA in assessment of 
a road investment plan. According to the findings, 11 respondents expressed skepticism with 
respect to the possibility of measuring noise and accidents in monetary terms. Regarding case 
A, it is important to notice that none of the respondents considered CBA as a final tool of 
decision making, i.e. CBA recommendations turned out to be insufficient to judge about the 
social desirability of the project. Regarding case B, the answers were more “promising” for 
CBA: its results gave a signal to look closer at the project for 11 members of the Parliament.   
To sum up, 14 out of 16 respondents appeared to be sceptical about monetary valuation of 
non-marketed goods, in one or another manner. 
As discussed by Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, p 71), it is useful to collect quantitative 
data about the lives saved or human health improved through implementation of particular 
policies, but it is confusing and thus pointless to provide the decision makers with the 
information on lives in terms of money equivalents. Similarly, Nyborg (2000) points out that 
if the goal of economic analysis is to supply the decision makers with sufficient background 
information about the alternative projects for the purposes of democratic debates, the role of 
CBA is much less recognizable because the net social benefit derived in CBA is too 
aggregated information, given existing normative disagreements between the decision 
makers. Nyborg constructs a formal mathematical model to arrive at informational 
requirements for democratic decision-making processes and finds out that physical unit 
indicators appear to be more relevant in that respect than monetary value-based indicators.  
CBA rests upon the monetary valuation of the impacts of a radiation-related project to make 
its benefits and costs comparable. As it was discussed in this section, the task of putting a 
price on a human life and health is a highly controversial and difficult to perform. Moreover, 
it may be considered ethically unacceptable if one takes into account the fundamental human 
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rights. Well-founded decisions imply that information about the issue at hand is accurate and 
understandable to use. Monetary values of life can be rather confusing, while factual 
information in physical units is more likely to supplement the decision makers’ own intuitive 
judgments. Besides, non-marketed values may be easily manipulated. The institutional 
aspects of CBA will be discussed in part 6. 
 
5.3. The flip side of nuclear power technology: uncertainty, risk perceptions 
and risk regulation 
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends CBA as a 
method of justifying radiation exposure practices and taking economic and social 
considerations into account (see ICRP, 1971; Ahmed and Daw, 1980). Thus when it comes to 
a nuclear power project, the analysts deal with technological risks, the monetary assessment 
of which they have to incorporate into CBA.  
However, regarding nuclear power technological risks, it may be relevant to distinguish 
between risk and uncertainty. Following Perman et al. (2003, p 445), the implications of 
imperfect information about the future can be different.  According to them, risk can be 
handled in some way due to enumerated states of nature and assigned probabilities. If it is 
impossible to assign probabilities to the possible consequences of a decision, the experts deal 
with uncertainty. Radical uncertainty in its turn implies that the decision maker becomes 
unable to come up with a list of alternative future states, let alone the distribution of 
probabilities. 
Otway (1974, p 73) states that there has been controversy around emergency core cooling 
systems since in 1969 deficiencies were indicated in the evaluation models and computer 
codes used in their design. According to him, these systems have been extensively studied 
since then in order to establish new design criteria. However, today, in 2011, the cooling 
systems of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors failed, and the situation seems to be 
almost uncontrollable (Watts et al., 2011).  
Thus it is reasonable to suggest that nuclear power technological risks may be more relevant 
to discuss in the context of uncertainty or even radical uncertainty, rather than risk. For 
example, Stirling (1998, p 102) summarizes uncertainty concepts in a figure and provides 
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suggested methods of dealing with risk, ambiguity, uncertainty, and ignorance. The first two 
presuppose firm or shaky bases for probabilities. Uncertainty, with no basis for probabilities, 
is equivalent to Perman’s interpretation of uncertainty, and suggests scenario analysis as a 
relevant method to apply. Ignorance is similar to Perman’s radical uncertainty, and it implies 
the use of the precautionary principle, according to Stirling.  
Munda argues (2006, p 8): “Analytic techniques such as cost benefit analysis (CBA) lose a 
considerable amount of information in trying to reduce the environmental complexity to a 
unique and unidimensional value. The use of precise, quantitative data based on monetary 
valuations (such as market prices) where complexity and uncertainty are pervasive can be 
misleading.” 
Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004, pp 117-118) promote ‘the precautionary principle’ which 
“is calling for policies to protect health from potential hazards even when definitive proof and 
measurement of those hazards is not yet available”. They argue (pp 118-119): “The 
precautionary approach is hard for the cost-benefit worldview to digest. Precautionary policy 
making rejects the quantitative formula of cost-benefit analysis, replacing it with a process of 
reasoning and deliberation that cannot be reduced to an alternative formula.” By analogy with 
insurance, Ackerman (2004) asserts that, by analogy with insurance, the worst possible 
outcome must be taken into account in policy analysis.  
Ayres and Sandilya (1987) point out that an optimal solution under utility maximization is 
based on a finite option value (OV), which fails to avert certain potential irreversible 
catastrophes, such as for example death of an individual. They state that an infinite OV should 
lead to catastrophe-averting decisions. Ayres and Sandilya thus develop the view that apart 
from any ethical considerations, the economic approach is unsatisfactory in case of a positive 
probability of irreversible catastrophes. This result is derived in Ayres and Sandilya (1986) 
where they show that the use of formal utility maximization leads to the choice of policies, 
which fail to avoid catastrophes. Namely, risk-averse decision making on the basis of CBA 
may select policies that fail to avert or even exacerbate avoidable disasters. Ayres and 
Sandilya (1987) emphasize the role of engineering analysis and simulation in the choice of a 
decision rule of policy making. On the basis of simulation techniques, Ayres and Sandilya 
demonstrate that a catastrophe can be avoided and that this can often be done at a modest or 
negligible cost. 
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There are also interesting results in decision sciences concerning how decision makers 
actually make decisions, in particular when they face risk and uncertainty. Kunreuther (2010, 
p 270) highlights the importance of taking into account the myopic behavior of decision 
makers, i.e. it is essential to recognize that in most cases decision makers tend to focus on 
short-term horizons. He argues therefore that to make them think long term requires an 
understanding of decision-making processes with respect to making tradeoffs between the 
costs of taking risk-reducing measures and the expected benefits from reducing future losses.  
Keeney (2010), while consulting on numerous policy decisions, such as siting a nuclear waste 
repository, noticed that decision makers have contradictory value judgments and cannot 
express clearly all of their relevant objectives. For example, when in one short questionnaire 
approximately 100 participants were asked to rank economic cost of the clean-up of old 
hazardous waste sites, potential human life lost or sickness due to the hazard, and potential 
damage to the natural environment, every respondent but one gave priority to the potential life 
lost or sickness and ranked economic costs as least important. However, in the subsequent 
discussion, very few of these participants appeared to regard as worth a $2 billion increase in 
clean-up costs to avoid 20 people being sick due to the hazard (p 241). 
Raiffa (2010, pp 248-249) points out that today the analysts act as “problem solvers” treating 
the issues independently and proposing decisions, which are based on utility considerations 
and individual attitudes toward risks. According to him, in the face of uncertainty, it is 
essential that the analysts instead would serve as “problem inventors”, in order to consider 
causal relationships between different problems and foresee the joint consequences of the 
decisions.  
Addressing the problem of evaluating alternative decisions involving uncertainty and 
potential fatalities, Keeney (1980) constructs a prescriptive model which aims to help 
decision makers to compare different alternatives and determine which one is the best. The 
model is based on the assumptions that allow using a well-behaved expected utility function 
for evaluation purposes. One of the crucial moments, emphasized by Keeney, is that in 
decision- making it is important to distinguish whether the potential fatalities result from 
voluntarily accepted risks or involuntarily accepted risks (p 190). 
As it was discussed in part 4, radioactivity has its specifics. In particular, the question of risk 
perceptions arises with regard to nuclear power technology. The main features of these 
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perceptions were covered in part 4, where it was stated that decision makers are supposed to 
take public risk perceptions into account, whatever they are. Different studies pose a question 
how risk perceptions affect risk regulation (e.g. Johansson-Stenman, 2008; O’Riordan, 1982; 
Salanié and Treich, 2009). 
Salanié and Treich (2009) investigate what implications the biased risk perceptions have for 
risk regulation. They point out that risk regulators do respond to the distorted risk perceptions, 
either due to political opportunism or just because they share similar risk perceptions. Salanié 
and Treich formally examine the choices of a paternalistic regulator to answer the question 
whether the risk regulators’ response to subjective risk perceptions is economically desirable. 
They arrive at a striking result: “One may provide an economic rationale for over-regulation 
of risks when people’s beliefs about risks are distorted, no matter the direction of distortion, 
and absent any political economy” (p 677). Thereby they conclude that the paternalistic 
approach to risk regulation may justify risk overregulation, irrespective of either people 
overestimate the risk or underestimate it. 
Johansson-Stenman (2008) considers the problem of perceived and objective risks in policy 
making. He argues that even though public risk perceptions are often systematically biased, 
they cannot be ignored because of the fear associated with the risk on the one hand, and due 
to their implications for decision making in the form of second-best adjustments, on the other. 
Among several measures of allowing for the perceived risks, Johansson-Stenman proposes 
risk-reducing investments and provision of costly information to reduce risk-perception 
biases. It is interesting that, according to his conclusions, under the second-best policy 
adjustments the optimal level of public safety investments is ambiguous as compared to the 
conventional efficiency rule (in terms of WTP) when people overestimate the risk (which is 
often a feature of nuclear power risk perceptions) (p 244).  
O’Riordan (1982) tackles the decision making in nuclear energy and finds it appropriate to 
consider, in which direction the social-science approach to risk perceptions might move in the 
light of further changes both in the technology of risk reduction and in the method of 
resolving the social and political acceptability of risk. O’Riordan argues that the social and 
political dimensions have transformed the fairly precise technological approach to risk into a 
significantly more complicated issue (p 97). He expresses the hope that the fused risk analysis 
will be successfully incorporated into the decision-making processes without destroying the 
technological dimension (p 100). 
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The flip side of nuclear power technology implies: (1) real-life disasters and catastrophes 
reveal its uncertainty-related nature, rather than just its risky features, but CBA does not 
explicitly take uncertainty into account; (2) the decision makers may be myopic, disregarding 
thereby uncertainty considerations and choosing economic tools like CBA; (3) public risk 
perceptions diverge from the scientific assessments of nuclear risks, but these perceptions 
have to be regulated, even though this task appears to be very demanding.  
 
6. Institutional aspects of cost-benefit analysis and suggested improvements  
Cass Sunstein in his book The Cost-Benefit State: the Future of Regulatory Protection (2002, 
pp 26-29) argues that CBA has significant advantages on the democratic grounds. First of all, 
the use of CBA allows reducing the role of special-interest groups in risk regulation and 
promoting accountability and transparency. Furthermore, he emphasizes that CBA serves 
public interests when it comes to health-related adverse effects of projects and policies. 
Namely, his arguments for CBA run as follows: 
“We have seen that regulation of nuclear power plants, designed to increased safety, 
might create health risks if it increases people’s use of fossil fuels, which create a 
range of environmental and health risks, including those from globe warming. 
“Health-health trade-offs” – and the introduction of substitute risks as a result of 
regulation – are omnipresent, and analysis of those trade-offs is important in its own 
right and a significant step in the direction of CBA, which puts the adverse health 
effects of regulation on the public viewscreen” (p 27).      
At last, Sunstein (2002) argues that CBA is advantageous because it generates a “cooling 
effect” on exaggerated public risk-related emotions, i.e. its use helps to overcome cognitive 
problems the ordinary people face when they think about risks.  
However, first, the very relationship between CBA and the democratic decision making has 
not been subject to enough explicit investigation in the literature. One of the exclusive 
attempts to do that will be addressed in section 6.1. Second, there is evidence on the 
endogeneity problem with CBA (Crespi, 2010). The clash of interests and the bias toward 
powerful special-interest groups will be approached in section 6.2. Third, the “democratic 
presumption” in CBA, i.e. the determining role of individuals’ preferences in guiding social 
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decision rules, is a matter for debate. As OECD (2006) states, this presumption turns out to be 
a weakness rather than a strength of CBA because it implies that counting of preferences is 
crucial, irrespective of the fact that the holders of these preferences might be badly informed 
(in particular, about the health-related risks due to nuclear power plants) (p 35). Moreover, 
OECD points out that under the “democratic presumption” it might be reasonable to 
distinguish between the individual’s preferences as a consumer, whose behavior is based on 
self-interest, and those as a citizen. In section 6.3 I address this problem with its possible 
implications for public participation in democratic decision-making.  
 
6.1. Cost-benefit analysis and criteria for democratic decision making  
In order to judge whether CBA meets criteria for democratic decision making, one must 
specify a set of such criteria. Robert A. Dahl, one of the most respected political scientists 
writing today, has supplied a number of requirements an ideal democracy has to fulfill (Dahl, 
1989, pp 109-120; Dahl, 2006, pp 8-10): 
Effective Participation: “Before a policy is adopted by the association, all the members of the 
demos must have equal and effective opportunities for making known to other members their 
views about what the policy should be” (Dahl, 2006, p 9). 
Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage: “When the moment arrives at which the decision will 
finally be made, every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and all 
votes must be counted as equal” (Dahl, 2006, p 9). 
Enlightened Understanding: “Within a reasonable amount of time, each member would have 
equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and their 
likely consequences” (Dahl, 2006, p 9). 
Final Control of the Agenda: “The demos would have the exclusive opportunity to decide 
how (and if) its members chose which matters are to be placed on the agenda. Thus the 
democratic process required by the three preceding features would never be closed. The 
policies of the association would always be open to change by the demos, if its members 
chose to do so” (Dahl, 2006, p 9). 
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Inclusion: “Every member of the demos would be entitled to participate in the ways just 
described: effective participation, equality in voting, seeking an enlightened understanding of 
the issues, and exercising final control over the agenda” (Dahl, 2006, p 9). 
Fundamental rights: “Each of the necessary features of an ideal democracy prescribes a right 
that is itself a necessary part of an ideal democratic order: a right to participate, a right to have 
one’s vote counted equally with the votes of others, a right to search for the knowledge 
necessary in order to understand the issue on the agenda, and a right to participate on an equal 
footing with one’s fellow citizens in exercising final control over the agenda. Democracy 
consists, then, not only of political processes. It is also necessarily a system of fundamental 
rights.” (Dahl, 2006, p 10) 
It is worth mentioning that in his book On Political Equality (2006) Dahl extended the 
original top five distinguishing features of an ideal democracy (Dahl, 1989) by the last item 
on the list. This last criterion is meant to emphasize that not only political processes of 
decision-making are to be judged on a democratic scale; a distribution of fundamental rights 
to take part in these processes also comes into play and has to be measured with regard to the 
democratic standards. This point is consistent with an assumption made by Dahl that the 
existence of political equality is a fundamental premise of democracy: “(…) the ideal of 
democracy presupposes that political equality is desirable. Thus if one believes in democracy 
as a goal or ideal, then implicitly they must view political equality as a goal or ideal” (Dahl, 
2006, p 2). This point raises in particular a substantial issue the power of special-interest 
groups which may be particularly important when it comes to life- and health-related political 
decisions. I will return to this idea later in section 6.2. 
Using the top four criteria, Nyborg and Spangen (2000) investigate whether CBA can be 
regarded as a democratic procedure for ranking alternative projects, on the one hand, and 
whether CBA can serve an informational input into democratic debate about collective 
decisions, on the other hand. They disregard the question of eliciting WTP for non-marketed 
goods, but taking this problem into account would only make the issue at hand even more 
prominent if CBA aims to be a decisive tool of policy analysis.  
Regarding CBA as a mechanism for making final decision making on the project (case A 
mentioned in part 1, p 4), Nyborg and Spangen (2000) arrive at the following findings: 
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Effective Participation: At first sight, CBA does perform well in this respect because WTP of 
any member of a society is incorporated into CBA on the equal grounds. Thus it reduces the 
role of politically powerful groups that might influence the decisions in the final stage. 
However, due to the fact that utility functions are based on self-interest and individual 
preferences, CBA does not actually satisfy this criterion in a proper way. Effective 
participation is aimed at what is best for society, and no individual is ever asked about that in 
CV surveys. Anyway, if asked, aggregating such preferences and interpreting the result would 
be highly controversial, and hardly consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of CBA. 
Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage: Assigning equal implicit weights to all individuals 
does not meet the principle of voting equality because CBA allocates more “votes” to the rich 
(this point relates to distributional aspects of CBA discussed in part 5.1, particularly 
concerning the choice of a numéraire). 
Enlightened Understanding: Individual preferences incorporated into CBA are assumed to be 
exogenous to a decision-making process, while political and ethical preferences are actually 
endogenous to it. In Dahl’s view Nyborg and Spangen (2000) thus emphasize that this 
criterion is irrelevant to CBA because preferences that are in-built in CBA cannot be shaped 
through public discussion. 
Final Control of the Agenda:  Since CBA focuses on the aggregated WTP, the range of 
concerns to be taken into account is restricted to efficiency considerations. Such issues as the 
distribution problem and rights cannot be controlled properly. Besides, an important 
requirement of this criterion for democratic decision making is that the citizens may withdraw 
efficiency considerations from the agenda if they find it appropriate. 
Nyborg and Spangen (2000) point out that CBA as an informational tool to democratic debate 
(case B) is irrelevant to consider with regard to Voting Equality and Final Control of the 
Agenda. They thus make the following conclusions concerning the two remaining criteria: 
Enlightened Understanding: The main requirement of this criterion is that a decision 
procedure has to supply every decision maker with the most important factual information in 
order to be regarded as a democratic procedure.  However, CBA presupposes that most 
citizens share its normative foundations (they were listed at the end of part 2 of the thesis). If 
some citizens consider such premises unacceptable, which might obviously be the case due to 
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the fact that existing interests are rarely congruent, they hardly arrive at a well-founded 
evaluation of the issue at hand taking into account their own political and ethical judgments.  
Effective Participation: Since the outcome of a CBA is too aggregated, CBA does not provide 
decision makers with equal and effective opportunities to express their preferences about the 
issue at hand. This point is clear when it comes to a health-related project: the aggregate net 
benefit derived in CBA does not communicate any descriptive information on specific 
adverse health effects of the project.  
Nyborg and Spangen (2000) conclude that CBA is inconsistent with Dahl’s criteria for 
democratic decision making. As a decisive rule, CBA allocates more “votes” to the rich. As 
an informational background, CBA appears to be not politically neutral. Consequently, those 
who apply the CBA methodology may enjoy the most influence. This fact can hardly be 
justified on the democratic grounds. According to OECD (2006, p 285), since CBA is non-
participatory (non-voting), its result cannot play that significant role which some experts 
assign to it.  
 
6.2. Clash of interests. Special-interest groups  
As it was discussed above, in practice CBA ignores the distributional concerns and allocates 
more “votes” to the rich. In this section and in the next one I address the third sub-question of 
this thesis:  Can the use of CBA be endogenous to a decision-making process (deliberately 
chosen as a tool of policy analysis by those who are interested in its results)? If yes, what 
implications can this have for the final stage of decision making about a radiation-related 
project if weak public participation is in place? 
To begin with, it makes sense to specify a democratic decision-making procedure, at least in a 
simplified form. I refer to the democratic decision process used by Nyborg (2000, p 349): 
1. The alternatives are specified and described. 
2. Each decision maker makes their subjective judgment about the various alternatives, 
based on the information from step 1 and their own ethical or political views. 
3. Decision makers’ individual judgments are aggregated to yield a collective choice.  
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The first two steps have been more or less addressed above in this thesis. Regarding steps 1 
and 2, I have discussed to what extent applied CBA may be a problematic tool to specify and 
describe the effects of a radiation-related projects due to its inherent methodological 
weaknesses, on the one hand; on the other hand, decision makers may experience difficulty 
using the result of a CBA if they do not accept its normative foundations. Moreover, it has 
been demonstrated that standard CBA does not meet the criteria for democratic decision 
making. Now, I introduce a conflict of interests into the three-step democratic process, and 
ask whether those who are favored by CBA can choose this tool of policy analysis and 
deliberately incorporate it into the decision making process. I guess that powerful interest 
groups, dominating in step 3 and interested in the results of CBA, may intentionally support 
the choice of CBA as a tool of specifying alternative policies in step 1. My strategy here is not 
to discuss how a clash of interests may be incorporated into CBA, rather to look at how CBA 
can be used in the context of conflict.  
While proponents of CBA, like Cass Sunstein, promote this tool as a measure against 
powerful interests in risk overregulation, it may happen that the situation is just the opposite, 
namely that it might be the case that the groups favored by CBA are politically powerful and 
thus exploit this tool to their own interests.  
Dahl (2006, p 51) emphasizes that political resources, information, skills, and incentives are 
distributed unequally. Among other things, political resources include money, information, 
and votes, which can be used to influence the behavior of other people. Dahl claims that the 
unequal distribution of political resources produces inequalities in the capacity of different 
citizens to employ their votes effectively to protect and advance their interests. Thus, on the 
one hand, those who enjoy greater political resources might be the most powerful. On the 
other hand, CBA allocates more “votes” to the rich, as it was discussed in the previous 
section. Consequently, the most powerful groups might deliberately choose CBA to exploit its 
weaknesses in their own favor. 
Revesz and Livermore (2008, p 164) argue that environmental and consumer protection 
groups are less likely to organize themselves into effective lobbying blocks, and that the 
industry, with fewer players and more at stake, will have the advantage. Similarly, in the 
public choice literature it is emphasized that groups with the largest stake in a particular 
project are more likely to become organized and have higher influence on policy making 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p 61). Ackerman and Herzberg (2004, pp 87-89) exemplify the 
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situation by the famous experience with the Ford Pinto and its exploding gas tank. In the 
1970s Ford lobbied intensively against the gas tank safety regulation, using CBA as one of 
their lobbying efforts. According to Ackerman and Herzberg, the society’s value of a 
statistical life was then manipulated in Ford’s favor. 
The choice of an appropriate decision mechanism used in step 3 of the democratic procedure 
thus seems to be very important. If the decision mechanism rests upon the results of a CBA, 
even Sunstein (2002) recognizes that there is no assurance that this tool of policy analysis will 
not be misused by the interested groups (p 29).     
Returning to Arrow’s impossibility theorem, a SWF cannot translate aggregated ordinal 
individual preferences into democratic policy choices. As discussed in Persson and Tabellini 
(2000, p 21), one of the important implications of the impossibility theorem is that the 
majority rule fails to produce a well-defined stable policy choice, i.e. it may not lead to a 
transitive binary relation between policy alternatives. This failure, known as the Condorcet 
paradox, gives rise to infinite voting cycles unless the agenda is restricted, i.e. unless it 
involves voting only in a finite number of steps. Restricted agendas in their turn give 
incentives for strategic agenda manipulation, either of the agenda itself or of the preferences 
revealed in the voting process (p 31).  
The agenda-setter model is one of the ways to deal with unfavorable implications of Arrow’s 
impossible theorem (Persson and Tabellini, 2000, p 32). The premises of the model imply that 
representatives have well-defined policy preferences and presuppose the presence of the 
political institution, which imposes a particular procedure for decision making. In this model 
the policy decision constitutes the outcome of a game with a well-defined extensive form. 
Persson and Tabellini state that there are often specific politicians who exert a great deal of 
influence on the alternative political decisions. They note that successful positive modeling of 
political decisions have to take this influence into account (p 37). It is reasonable to suggest 
that being powerful these politicians can get access to the agenda setting and choose the 
preferred decision rule. In the light of the institutional aspects of CBA (in particular, that this 
tool is non-participatory in the final stage of collective decision making), it might be the case 
that the powerful interest groups control the agenda and use CBA as an agenda-setter tool. 
Nyborg (2002) argues that the goal of project analysis is decisive when one chooses to 
translate all possible consequences in money units. According to her, it might be the case that 
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the experts, who claim that placing price on environmental goods is essential for well-founded 
political decisions, implicitly consider ranking as the goal of project analysis (p 11). Nyborg’s 
conclusion is highly consistent with how Dunster11 (1973) justifies the ‘essential need for 
CBA’ as a tool of policy analysis for U.K. nuclear power technology. At the outset he argues 
(p 192):  
“Some form of deliberate12 but rational simplification is almost always needed if the 
process of reaching decisions is to avoid being purely intuitive.” In the way to the 
‘deliberate rational specification’ he provides three separate stages of CBA 
application: “(…) to decide if a proposal is likely to be beneficial or otherwise; to 
optimize procedures within that proposal with the aim of achieving a maximum net 
benefit; and to compare several optimized proposals and choose the best.” With regard 
to safety considerations, Dunster assumes that people rationally give priority to their 
personal everyday objectives, like travelling by car or swimming, before they reveal 
safety concerns. Thus he claims that ‘no one actually puts safety first – we cannot 
afford to’ and thereby rejects the criticism of CBA application for the nuclear power 
technology in an absolutely striking manner: “(…) we conduct intuitive cost-benefit 
analyses to choose those risks which we will accept for ourselves or impose on others 
and those which we will not. All that the formal process of cost benefit analysis does 
is to offer us a tool to help us make these decisions rationally and consistently.”  
I interpret Dunster’s justification of CBA in nuclear power technology as follows: first, the 
deliberative choice of CBA as a tool of policy analysis in U.K nuclear power technology has 
the aim to rank the alternatives, rather than to supplement the democratic decision-making 
process with sufficient background information to make well-founded collective decisions. 
Second, Dunster makes it explicitly clear that someone can give a good reason for imposing 
risks on other people, if this someone finds it beneficial according to his or her rational 
weighing of benefits against costs; and CBA is a helpful tool to do that formally.  Indeed, 
CBA might be a convenient tool to apply by those who most benefit from its result because 
CBA is aimed at a final ranking of the available alternatives; it is an output of some specific 
views and preferences, and it is non-participatory.  
                                                 
11 John Dunster (1922 – 2006) served as deputy director general and director of nuclear safety of the U.K. Health and Safety 
Executive and later was director of the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB). 
12 The use of italics here is mine. 
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Dahl (2006, pp 85-86) claims that the cumulative advantages in power, influence, and 
authority of the more privileged strata may become so overwhelming that even if the less 
privileged constitute a majority of citizens they are simply unable, and perhaps even 
unwilling, to make the effort to overcome the politically powerful forces. If the most powerful 
are so powerful and might exploit their preferable tools, the question arises whether there 
exists some way to balance the conflicting interests, to select an appropriate decision rule in 
the final stage of the decision-making process, and to choose a politically neutral tool of 
policy analysis. This seems to be rather significant, especially when the consequences of 
policy choices might be far-reaching, as in case of nuclear power. 
As emphasized by O’Connor and Wenger (2010, p 255), most of the time policy change is 
slight and incremental because the distribution and relative power of interest groups are 
stable. Wilson (2000) considers the role of different ‘stressors’, such as a catastrophic event or 
an information leak, that provoke questions about the legitimacy of the existing arrangements, 
stimulate pressure for policy changes and create strategic advantages for groups promoting an 
alternative policy agenda. He provides an interesting non-incremental shift in U.S. 
organizational and policy goal changes: 
“Originally nuclear energy policy operated in a closed system (…) in which corporate, 
political, and technocratic elites advocating nuclear power had privileged access to the 
most insulated and centralized interiors of the policy process. Several factors 
contributed to the dissolution of this policy monopoly and policy change: the defection 
of a few technical Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) staff members who questioned 
the safety of nuclear energy; the expansion of the issue as AEC scientists leaked 
information to other initially excluded organizations such as the Union of Concerned 
Scientists; the dramatic increase of negative media attention; the change of the image 
of nuclear energy from positive to negative” (pp 249-250). “The old AEC gave 
priority to promoting nuclear energy. The new NRC (the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission) was given primary responsibility for safety. The dismantling of the AEC 
and the formation of the NRC reflected the growing power of the anti-nuclear 
movement and the ascension of a new, more negative image of nuclear energy. For 
example the old paradigm that promoted nuclear energy as cheap and safe was 
replaced by a new paradigm that emphasized the dangers of melt-downs and radiation 
leaks and the problems of disposing of nuclear waste materials” (p 265).  
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In the light of the example, it might be the case that one way to stimulate policy changes and 
shift the power from the most powerful is “stressors”. Today, the evidence of this link 
between a “stressor” and policy change comes from Germany, which intends to abandon 
nuclear power: “The transition was supposed to happen slowly over the next 25 years, but is 
now being accelerated in the wake of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster, which 
Chancellor Angela Merkel has called a "catastrophe of apocalyptic dimensions" (Baetz, 
2011).  
However, in order to arrive at a non-incremental policy change, the counter groups have to be 
in place to promote this change. If the counter groups are poorly organized or absent, even a 
strong ‘stressor’, like a catastrophe, may not work. Moreover, stronger and more organized 
public participation might be needed to counterbalance powerful interest groups. Revesz and 
Livermore (2008, p 5) claim that on the one hand CBA is biased against regulation, and on 
the other hand environmental and other progressive groups reject to participate in political 
processes concerning CBA. The resulting asymmetry in political participation may give rise 
to the misuse of CBA, according to Revesz and Livermore. They emphasize that more active 
participation of the ordinary citizens is essential as well to neutralize the conflict of interests 
around CBA. However, citizens may not participate for certain reasons, which I address in the 
following section. 
Concluding this section, it is reasonable to suggest that the outcome of CBA, which can favor 
powerful political groups, may be endogenous to the final stage of a decision-making 
procedure and thus to the procedure itself. Having access to this final stage, where collective 
decisions are made, politically powerful groups may manipulate introducing CBA as a 
decisive tool of policy analysis. Different “stressors” and more active public participation 
might add to possible positive changes of the situation. 
 
6.3. Roots of weak public participation   
As it was mentioned in part 1, p 8, within the democratic premises the Strong Principle of 
Equality implies the inclusion of all adult citizens into a decision-making process. However, 
due to the ‘law of time and numbers’ (see part 1, p 9), in practice the democratic procedure is 
representative, i.e. the citizens delegate policy choices to the elected representatives. This law 
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might serve as an obvious technical reason for weak public involvement in collective 
decisions making. 
In January 1991 Frank Hahn made several interesting predictions for the next hundred years, 
which concerned the future role of the economic theorems and axioms prevailing in the 
economic theory, such as for example the axiom of rationality. Hahn (1991, p 47) believes 
that “theorising of the ‘pure’ sort will become both less enjoyable and less and less possible.” 
He predicts that computer simulations will replace theorems, and that psychological, 
sociological, and historical postulates have loomed on the horizon to displace simple 
transparent economic axioms. Hahn does not entirely reject the role of the economic method; 
rather, he states that theoretically useful results are a combination of different approaches to a 
problem at hand. 
Indeed, today many scholars have realised that the key to improving economic decision 
making implies the careful empirical study of how people actually make decisions (Michel-
Kerjan and Slovic, 2010, p 5). As a result, new multidisciplinary fields (e.g. economic 
psychology, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, etc.) have emerged to integrate theories 
and results from different sciences. My aim here is to point to some possible explanations of 
the weak public participation with the help of an interdisciplinary approach. What seems to be 
important is that the roots of weak public participation may lie somewhat deeper than simply 
be explained by ‘the law of time and numbers’. 
One possible explanation is ‘human drives’, as defined by Dahl (2006). In describing what 
drives people in their struggle for greater political equality, Dahl emphasizes the role of 
human feelings and emotions, rather than the role of human reason. He exemplifies this point 
by the powerful role of envy in strengthening the practice of competitive consumption, and 
claims that the culture of consumerism exerts much higher influence on individuals’ behavior 
than, as Dahl defines it, ‘the culture of citizenship’ (pp 88-90). Thus many individuals may 
prefer to raise their ever-rising private consumption, rather than participate in society-related 
issues. 
There is evidence that once people have achieved a rather modest level of consumption, 
further increases in income and consumption no longer generate an increase in their sense of 
well-being or happiness (see e.g. Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010, pp 5-10). Dahl (2006) argues 
that this aspect of human nature may promote a positive shift from the prevailing culture of 
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consumerism toward the culture of citizenship: the greater a number of people in the rich 
countries who experience this aspect, the more people evolve from consumers into active 
citizens (pp 106-107).  
It is noteworthy that for the people in poorer countries the effect of increasing income and 
consumption on well-being or happiness is clearer (Layard, 2003, p 17). Taking into account 
Dahl’s argument above, it is reasonable to suggest that poorer people, who are more 
concerned with consumption needs, may participate less actively in public issues. According 
to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (see e.g. Boeree, 1998), preferences on higher levels hardly 
motivate a person lest their lower-lying needs stay unsatisfied. In particular, Boeree points to 
the following: “If you are living through an economic depression or a war, or are living in a 
ghetto or in rural poverty, do you worry about these issues, or do you worry about getting 
enough to eat and a roof over your head?” Then Boeree states referring to Maslow’s theory: 
“(…) much of the what is wrong with the world comes down to the fact that very few people 
really are interested in these values – not because they are bad people, but because they 
haven’t even had their basic needs taken care of!” 
In my subjective opinion, according to Maslow’s pyramid of preferences, the transformation 
of the consumer into the citizen is likely to happen somewhere on the bridge between the third 
and forth levels of the hierarchy. I guess that a person will hardly actively participate in 
society-related projects if their bottom individual preferences are kept unsatisfied or even if 
satisfaction of these primary needs falls substantially behind that of other members of the 
society.  
Concluding this section, I would like to point out that possibly my subjective point of view on 
the roots of weak public participation can be argued, and the true range of such roots is 
different to those I considered in this section. My aim was to make a humble attempt to apply 
an interdisciplinary approach to this problem. The point is that the problem of weak public 
participation might be significant in the context of the dominating special-interest groups. The 
misbalance of interests in the final stage of a decision-making process might intensify the 
misuse of such non-participatory tools of policy analysis as CBA. For such complicated issues 
as radiation-related projects, this may be fraught with far-reaching negative consequences, 
such as increased risks of adverse human health effects.  
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7. Alternatives to cost-benefit analysis 
As an alternative to CBA, other decision-making procedures are proposed. Most of them are 
covered for example in OECD (2006, pp 269-276). OECD (2006) states that most of the 
existing alternatives vary in degree of comprehensiveness and rather narrow; and none of 
them are at least as comprehensive as CBA. The only exception among them is multi-criteria 
analysis, which may be even more comprehensive than CBA once goals beyond efficiency are 
considered. 
I will refrain from returning to cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) since it was to a relatively 
large degree considered above. Instead, I will address briefly two other existing alternative 
methods, which may be used in assessment of the radiation-related projects. Besides, it is 
reasonable to compare any recommended alternative to CBA according to some criterion. The 
basic assumption throughout the thesis, stated at p 4, was that the goal of the economic 
analysis is to inform participants in a decision-making process, in order to make their political 
and ethical judgments as well-founded as possible. Thus I will look at the alternatives to CBA 
from this perspective.   
Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) is in many respects similar to cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA), but it involves multiple indicators of effectiveness. The available options get ranked 
on the basis of various criteria that are regarded as relevant. The distinctive feature of MCA is 
that it uses the preferences of decision makers, not the population’s preferences as CBA. Like 
CEA, MCA is proposed as an alternative to CBA when it comes to the consideration of 
criteria which cannot be easily expressed in monetary terms. The procedure of MCA is rather 
complicated to discuss it here and involves many steps; therefore I refer to Zopounidis and 
Pardalos (2010) for the profound discussion of MCA. Here, it is more interesting to look at 
the importance of MCA results in a decision-making process. 
OECD (2006, p 276) emphasizes that MCA tends to be more transparent than CBA because 
objectives and criteria are clearly stated, rather than assumed. Munda (2000, p 17) argues that 
since MCA allows taking into account conflicting, multidimensional, and uncertain effects of 
decisions, this technique may be a promising tool of policy analysis under conditions of 
complexity. 
Gamper and Turcanu (2007) investigate the development of the potential of MCA to be used 
as an effective tool of policy analysis. They conveniently summarize several strengths and 
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weaknesses of using MCA for public decisions (see their Table 1, p 300). In particular, they 
emphasize the advantage of MCA in stimulating discussions, its ability to tackle qualitative 
and intangible factors, and its support of broad stakeholder participation. On the other hand, 
MCA does not protect against possible information bias from certain groups to strengthen 
their power. Gamper and Turcanu come to the conclusion that MCA can improve on the final 
judgment about the desirability of a project both on the efficiency and distributional grounds. 
A difficult point is information sharing, because on the hand it is a demanding task to make 
technical information understandable to decision makers, and on the other hand to make 
technical specialists become aware of the social and political dimensions of the problem at 
hand. MCA provides final decision makers with reliable information about the affected 
people’s preferences, and structures this information in the light of policy objectives and 
options to achieve them, according to Gamper and Turcanu.  
However, according to Perman et al. (2003, p 383), the relevant way of making decisions is 
rather through the deliberations of citizens, than the preferences of the decision makers. 
Moreover, like CBA, MCA can be considered as an output of some specific incorporated 
preferences, rather than an input into a democratic decision-making process.  
Cost-Impact Analysis (CIA) was introduced by Ministry of Finance of Norway in 1998 as 
an alternative to CBA and CEA, in case information in physical unit indicators may be more 
useful for decision-making purposes, than that in money terms (Ministry of Finance, 1998, p 
11). This tool of policy analysis is recommended especially for the health sector when the 
benefits of different projects are not necessarily similar in kind (as it is the case for CEA). The 
costs are expressed in money units; while the benefits are interpreted in best available units 
and can be accompanied by descriptive information on the aspects, which may be difficult to 
quantify (Nyborg 2002, pp 7-8). 
Nyborg (2000, p 394) states that the possibility of separating factual information from 
normative foundations is a necessary condition for a democratic debate. CIA meets this 
requirement because it is not initially meant to rank available alternatives in one way or 
another. Rather, factual information about the project is provided to the decision makers who 
in their turn judge about the social desirability of the project on the basis of their ethical and 
political views (Nyborg 2002, p 8). Thus, CIA succeeds in supplying background information 
into a democratic decision-making process, when the purpose of policy analysis is case B. 
Since information in physical units can be crucial for intuitive understanding of a project’s 
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welfare effects, Nyborg (2002, p 37) argues that there may often be sufficient grounds for the 
choice of CIA as a tool of environmental policy analysis, instead of CBA. 
Consequently, both MCA and CIA help to overcome the problem of monetary valuation of 
non-marketed goods. However, MCA is similar to CBA in the sense of being an output of 
preferences of particular decision makers, and thus MCA does not facilitate the democratic 
debate about a project. CIA improves on providing relatively sufficient background 
information into democratic decision-making processes. 
 
Conclusion 
The central question approached in this master thesis was formulated as follows: Can cost-
benefit analysis improve on decision-making processes concerning projects related to the risk 
of exposure to radiation and subsequent adverse health effects? To answer it, I explicitly kept 
to one simple assumption throughout the discussion of the issue at hand: The role of an 
economic analysis is to supply the decision makers with sufficient and understandable 
information to make well-founded political decisions. 
In order to find an answer to the main question, three sub-problems were formulated. Time 
has come to highlight the solutions to them.   
1. Can CBA be used to judge about the social desirability of a radiation-related project? 
As long as there is no single agreed-upon form of SWF, the results of a CBA can be regarded 
as an output of some specific normative judgments and preferences of a particular decision 
maker. Putting prices on non-marketed goods, such as human life and health, turns out to be a 
highly controversial and demanding task on the methodological grounds. The separation of 
efficiency and distributional considerations in applied CBA limits its applicability as a tool of 
policy analysis on the one hand, but on the other hand, it is difficult to incorporate appropriate 
welfare weights into applied CBA to account for distributional concerns.  The uncertainty-
related nature of nuclear-power technology and public risk perceptions of radioactivity are not 
explicitly taken into account in CBA. Such methodological background allows to judge about 
the social desirability of the project only to a limited extent because the social net benefit in 
monetary terms does not reflect all possible consequences of the project.     
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2. Can cost-benefit analysis be useful as a background for democratic decision-making 
processes, i.e. serve as an informational input in a democratic decision process, thereby 
facilitating such a process? 
The highly aggregate result of a CBA might be difficult to understand and process, and it is an 
output of preferences of a particular decision maker. Those decision makers who do not share 
the normative foundations of CBA can find its result less useful as an informational input. 
Since neutral normative basis is important for a tool of policy analysis, but such neutrality is 
problematic for CBA, CBA can supply decision makers with information which can be easily 
misinterpreted, and thus it appears to be inappropriate for debate purposes in a decision-
making process.  
3. Can the use of a cost-benefit analysis be endogenous to a decision-making process (i.e. can 
CBA be deliberately chosen as a tool of policy analysis by those who are interested in its 
results)? If yes, what implications can this have for the final stage of decision making about a 
radiation-related project if weak public participation is in place?  
CBA does not meet the criteria for democratic decision making, neither as a measure of social 
desirability nor as an informational input. Strong special-interest groups can possibly 
manipulate the outcome of a CBA, particularly if decision makers do not receive information 
on these groups. Moreover, the use of CBA may to be endogenous to the decision procedure, 
i.e. powerful groups that enjoy huge political resources and have access to the final stage of a 
decision-making process may manipulate introducing CBA as a decisive tool of policy 
analysis. The misbalance of interests in the final stage due to weak public participation might 
intensify the misuse of CBA because CBA has a non-participatory nature.  
It might be the case that the main concern related to the nuclear power technology is that of 
uncertainty, rather than risk. Several real-life disasters, such as the recent catastrophic 
situation with Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors, point to the radically uncertain 
nature of radiation. If it is the case, this could make CBA less suitable than some other 
alternatives. How CBA is conducted (the methodological aspects), and how it is used in the 
context of conflict (the institutional aspects), put severe obstacles in its way to improve on 
decision-making processes, especially in such fields where the consequences of decisions 
might be far-reaching or even irreversible, like radiation with its adverse impacts on human 
health and life. 
52 
 
References 
 
Ackerman, F. and L. Heinzerling (2004): Priceless: on knowing the price of everything and 
the value of nothing, New Press, New York. 
Ackerman, F. (2004): “Priceless Benefits, Costly Mistakes: What’s Wrong with Cost-Benefit 
Analysis?” http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue25/Ackerman25.htm 
Adamowicz, W., D. Dupont, A. Krupnick and J. Zhang (2011): “Valuation of cancer and 
microbial disease risk reductions in municipal drinking water: An analysis of risk context 
using multiple valuation methods”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
61, 213-226.    
Ahearne, J.F. (2000): “Intergenerational Issues Regarding Nuclear Power, Nuclear Waste, and 
Nuclear Weapons”, Risk Analysis Vol. 20 No. 6, 763-770.  
Ahmed, J.U. and H.T. Daw (1980): “Cost-Benefit Analysis and Radiation Protection”, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, BULLETIN-VOL.22 Nr. 5/6,    
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull225_6/225_605041322.pdf 
Alberini, A., M. Cropper, A. Krupnick and N.B. Simon (2004): “Does the value of statistical 
life vary with age and health status?” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
48, 769-792. 
Ayres, R.U. and M.S. Sandilya (1986): “Catastrophe avoidance and risk aversion: 
implications of formal utility maximization”, Theory and Decision 20, 63-78. 
Ayres, R.U. and M.S. Sandilya (1987): “Utility Maximization and Catastrophe Aversion: A 
Simulation Test”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 14, 337-370. 
Baetz, J. (2011): “Germany set to abandon nuclear power for good”, 
www.renewableenergyworld.com, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/partner/free-
green-concepts/news/article/2011/03/germany-set-to-abandon-nuclear-power-for-good 
Boeree, C.G. (1998): “Abraham Maslow”, Personality Theories, 
http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/maslow.html 
Brekke, K.A. (1997): “The numéraire matters in cost-benefit analysis”, Journal of Public 
Economics 64, 117-123.  
Broome, J. (1978): “Trying to value a life”, Journal of Public Economics 9, 91-100. 
Cardis, E. et al. (2005): “Risk of cancer after low doses of ionizing radiation: retrospective 
cohort study in 15 countries”, http://www.bmj.com/content/331/7508/77.full 
Carson, R.T., and W.M. Hanemann (2005): “CONTINGENT VALUATION”, in Maler K.G. 
and J.R. Vincent, eds., Handbook of Environmental Economics, Chapter 17, North Holland, 
822-936. 
53 
 
Christiansen, V. (1983): “Some Important Properties of the Social Marginal Utility of 
Income”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 85 (3), 359-371. 
Crespi G.S. (2010): “The Endogeneity Problem in Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Georgetown 
Journal of Law and Public Policy Vol. 8 No. 1, 91-146. 
Dahl, R.A. (1989): Democracy and its Critics, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.  
Dahl, R.A. (2006): On political equality, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.  
Dolan, P. and R. Edlin (2002): “Is it really possible to build a bridge between cost-benefit 
analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis?” Journal of Health Economics 21, 827–843. 
Donaldson, C., S. Birch and A. Gafni (2002): “The distribution problem in economic 
evaluation: income and the valuation of costs and consequences of health care programmes”, 
Health Economics 11, 55–70. 
Drèze, J. and N. Stern (1987): “The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis”, in Auerbach A. J. and 
M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. II, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, North-Holland, 909-990. 
Drèze, J. (1998): “Distribution matters in cost-benefit analysis: Comment on K.A. Brekke”, 
Journal of Public Economics 70, 485–488. 
Dunster, J. (1973): “Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Power”, New Scientist, 18 October 1973, 
192-194. 
Gamper C.D. and C. Turcanu (2007): “On the governmental use of multi-criteria analysis”, 
Ecological Economics 62, 298-307. 
Gregory, R., P. Slovic; and G. Flynn (1996): “Risk perceptions, stigma, and health policy”, 
Health & Place. Vol. 2 No. 4, 213-220. 
Hahn, F. (1991): “The next hundred years”, The Economic Journal 101, 47-50. 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) (1971): Recommendations of 
the ICRP, ICRP Publication 26. Ann. ICRP 1 (3). 
Johannesson, M. (1995): “The relationship between cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-
benefit analysis”, Social Science and Medicine 41 (4), 483–489. 
Johansson, P.O. (1993): Cost-benefit analysis of environmental change. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Johansson, P.O. (1995): Evaluating health risks: an economic approach, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Johansson-Stenman, O. (2005): “Distributional Weights in Cost-Benefit Analysis—Should 
We Forget about Them?” Land Economics 81 (3), 337–352. 
Johansson-Stenman, O. (2008): “Mad cows, terrorism and junk food: Should public policy 
reflect perceived or objective risks?” Journal of Health Economics 27, 234–248. 
54 
 
Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk”, 
Econometrica Vol. 47 No. 2, 263-291.  
Keeney, R.L. (1980): “Evaluation Alternatives Involving Potential Fatalities”, Operations 
Research Vol. 28 No. 1, 188-205. 
Keeney, R.L. (2010): “Thinking Clearly about Policy Decisions. The importance of Training 
Policy Makers in Decision Sciences”, in Michel-Kerjan, E., and P. Slovic, eds., The Irrational 
economist: making decisions in a dangerous world, PublicAffairs, New York, 239-247. 
Kenkel, D. (1997): “On valuing morbidity, cost-effectiveness analysis, and being rude”, 
Journal of Health Economics 16, 749-757.  
Knetsch, J.L. (1990): “Environmental Policy Implications of Disparities between Willingness 
to Pay and Compensation Demanded Measures of Values”, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 18, 227-237. 
Krüger N.A. and M. Svensson (2009):  “The impact of real options on willingness to pay for 
mortality risk reductions”, Journal of Health Economics 28, 563-569. 
Kunreuther, H. (2010): “Reflections and Guiding Principles for Dealing with Societal Risks”, 
in Michel-Kerjan, E., and P. Slovic, eds., The Irrational economist: making decisions in a 
dangerous world, PublicAffairs, New York, 263-274. 
Layard, R. (2003): “Happiness: Has Social Science a Clue?” Lionel Robbins Memorial 
Lectures 2002/3, London School of Economics, 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/staff/person.asp?id=970 
Loomis, J.B. (2011): "Incorporating Distributional Issues into Benefit Cost Analysis: Why, 
How, and Two Empirical Examples Using Non-market Valuation", Journal of Benefit-Cost 
Analysis Vol. 2: Iss. 1 Article 5.  
Medin, H., K. Nyborg and I. Bateman (2001): “The assumption of equal marginal utility of 
income: how much does it matter?” Ecological Economics 36, 397–411. 
Michel-Kerjan, E. and P. Slovic (2010): “An Idea Whose Time Has Come”, in Michel-
Kerjan, E., and P. Slovic, eds., The Irrational economist: making decisions in a dangerous 
world, PublicAffairs, New York, 1-8. 
Ministry of Finance (1998): Kostnadsberegningsutvalget (1998): Nytte-kostnadsanalyser. 
Veiledning i bruk av lønnsomhetsvurderinger i offentlig sektor, Oslo: FIN, NOU 1998:16. 
Ministry of Finance (2005): Veileder i samfunnsøkonomiske analyser, Finansdepartementet, 
Norge.  
Munda, G. (2000): “Conceptualizing and Responding to Complexity”, Environmental 
Valuation in Europe (EVE), Policy Research Brief Number 2, Series Editors: Clive L. Spash 
& Claudia Carter, http://www.clivespash.org/eve/PRB2-edu.pdf 
Nord, E. (1999): Cost-value analysis in health care: making sense out of QALYs, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
55 
 
Nyborg, K. (1996): “Information requirements for environmental policy making”, 
Økonomiske doktoravhandlinger nr 32, Sosialøkonomisk institutt, Universitetet i Oslo, Oslo.  
Nyborg, K. (1998): “Some Norwegian politicians’ use of cost-benefit analysis”, Public 
Choice 95, 381–401. 
Nyborg, K. (2000): “Project analysis as input to public debate: Environmental valuation 
versus physical unit indicators”, Ecological Economics 34, 393–408. 
Nyborg, K. (2002): Miljø og nytte-kostnadsanalyse. Noen prinsipielle vurderinger. Rapport 
5/2002, Frischsenteret, Oslo.  
Nyborg, K. and I. Spangen (2000): “Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Democratic Ideal”, Nordic 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 26, 83-93. 
O’Connor, R.E. and D.E. Wenger (2010): “Influential Social Science, Risks, and Disasters. A 
View from the National Science Foundation”, in Michel-Kerjan, E., and P. Slovic, eds., The 
Irrational economist: making decisions in a dangerous world, PublicAffairs, New York, 254-
262. 
O’Riordan, T. (1982): “Risk-Perception Studies and Policy Priorities”, Risk Analysis Vol. 2 
No. 2, 95-100.  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2006): “Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and the Environment: Recent Developments”, OECD Publishing. 
Olsen, J.A. (1997): “AIDING PRIORITY SETTING IN HEALTH CARE: IS THERE A 
ROLE FOR THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD?” Health Economics, Vol. 6, 
603–612. 
Olsen, J.A. (2000): “A note on eliciting distributive preferences for health”, Journal of Health 
Economics 19, 541–550. 
Otway, H. J. (1974): “Nuclear Power Plant Safety”, IAEA Bulletin 1974, 16/1&2, 72. 
Perman, R., Y. Ma, J. McGilvray and M. Common (2003): Natural resource and 
environmental economics, Pearson, Harlow. 
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2000): Political economics: explaining economic policy, MIT 
Press, Cambridge. 
Raiffa, H. (2010): “Decision Making. A view on Tomorrow”, in Michel-Kerjan, E., and P. 
Slovic, eds., The Irrational economist: making decisions in a dangerous world, PublicAffairs, 
New York, 248-253. 
Revesz, R.L. and M.A. Livermore (2008): Retaking rationality: how cost-benefit analysis can 
better protect the environment and our health, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Rosen, S. (1974): “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure 
Competition”, Journal of Political Economy Vol. 82 No. 1, 34-55. 
56 
 
Salanié, F. and N. Treich (2009): “REGULATION IN HAPPYVILLE”, Economic Journal, 
119 (April), 665–679. 
Sen, A. (1987): On ethics and economics, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Serebrov, A. and A. Okorokov (2000): “Forty years of neutron research in Gatchina”, 
Neutron News 11: 2, 18–27. 
Slovic, P. (2000): The perception of risk, Earthscan, London. 
Stirling, A. (1998): “Risk at a turning point?” Journal of Risk Research 1 (2), 97-109. 
Sunstein, C.R. (2002): The cost-benefit state: the future of regulatory protection, Section of 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, ABA, Chicago, Ill. 
Treich, N. (2010): “The value of a statistical life under ambiguity aversion”, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 59, 15-26.  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2000): Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses. 
EPA 240-R-00-003, Washington DC. 
Varian, H.R. (1992): Microeconomic analysis, Norton, New York. 
Wagstaff, A. (1991): “QALYs and the equity-efficiency trade-off”, Journal of Health 
Economics 10, 21-41.  
Watts, J., J. McCurry and R. McKie (2011): “Japan nuclear fears as systems fail at second 
reactor”, www.guardian.co.uk, 13 March 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/12/japan-nuclear-meltdown-fukushima-
reactor?INTCMP=SRCH 
Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett (2010): The spirit level: why equality is better for everyone. 
Penguin Books, London. 
Willinger, M. (2001): “Environmental Quality, Health and the Value of Life”, Environmental 
Valuation in Europe (EVE), Policy Research Brief Number 7, Series Editors: Clive L. Spash 
& Claudia Carter, http://www.clivespash.org/eve/PRB7-edu.pdf 
Wilson, C.A. (2000): “Policy Regimes and Policy Change”, Journal of Public Policy 20, 247-
274. 
Zerbe, R.O. and A.S. Bellas (2006): A Primer for Benefit-Cost Analysis, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Zopounidis C. and P.M. Pardalos (2010): Handbook of Multicriteria Analysis (Applied 
Optimization), Vol. 103, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Zweifel, P., F. Breyer and M. Kifmann (2009): Health Economics, Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
 
57 
 
 
